Migration after the Arab Spring

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The Migration Policy Centre (MPC)

Mission statement

The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, conducts advanced research on global migration to serve migration governance needs at European level, from developing, implementing and monitoring migration-related policies to assessing their impact on the wider economy and society.

Rationale

Migration represents both an opportunity and a challenge. While well-managed migration may foster progress and welfare in origin- as well as destination countries, its mismanagement may put social cohesion, security and national sovereignty at risk. Sound policy-making on migration and related matters must be based on knowledge, but the construction of knowledge must in turn address policy priorities. Because migration is rapidly evolving, knowledge thereof needs to be constantly updated. Given that migration links each individual country with the rest of the world, its study requires innovative cooperation between scholars around the world.

The MPC conducts field as well as archival research, both of which are scientifically robust and policy-relevant, not only at European level, but also globally, targeting policy-makers as well as politicians. This research provides tools for addressing migration challenges, by: 1) producing policy-oriented research on aspects of migration, asylum and mobility in Europe and in countries located along migration routes to Europe, that are regarded as priorities; 2) bridging research with action by providing policy-makers and other stakeholders with results required by evidence-based policy-making, as well as necessary methodologies that address migration governance needs; 3) pooling scholars, experts, policy makers, and influential thinkers in order to identify problems, research their causes and consequences, and devise policy solutions.

The MPC’s research includes a core programme and several projects, most of them co-financed by the European Union.

Results of the above activities are made available for public consultation through the website of the project: www.migrationpolicycentre.eu

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**Executive Summary**

This paper will provide a statistical assessment of migration before and after the uprisings in the Southern Mediterranean. It will review European and Arab state policies regarding migration and will ultimately encourage the factoring of the outcomes of the Arab Spring within migration policies on both shores of the Mediterranean. The assessment is based upon the most recent statistical data gathered directly from the competent offices in European Member States; from policy documents emanating from the European Union and concerned States; and from first-hand accounts from surveys conducted in Spring 2012 by scholars in six Arab countries (within Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon) in collaboration with the Migration Policy Centre (MPC).

Notably, migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, apart from a short-lived movement from Tunisia, but has simply continued along previous trends. In sharp contrast, migration within the Southern Mediterranean has been deeply impacted by the events as outflows of migrants and refugees fled instability and violence in Libya and Syria.

The Arab Spring already triggered two major refugee crises in the Neighbourhood of Europe, previously in Libya and currently in Syria. Out of more than one million which fled Libya, only 25,000 reached Europe; and out of 100,000 who are fleeing Syria, perhaps only a few hundreds are today in Europe. While a Regional Protection Programme has been launched to safely accommodate refugees in the vicinity of their homelands in North Africa, no significant move towards a policy of resettlement in Europe has yet taken place. The bulk of the burden was supported by neighbouring Arab States and Turkey. Governments and international organizations also took their part, but remarkably civil society and local populations played the biggest role.

European and Arab states have responded to these movements, both to Europe and within the region, in several ways. In the Arab States, the topic of migration was simply eclipsed by social and political movements in the media and public debate. However, several newly formed governments took initiatives to better incorporate their diasporas in, not only economic, but also political processes.

The EU and its Member States viewed the monumental changes taking place in the Arab world as a unique political opportunity, not only for the Arab peoples, but also for the Mediterranean region and for Europe’s multifaceted links with these countries. In response, the EU expanded its focus on democracy promotion within the region.

Although new emphasis was dedicated to democracy-building, the EU did not invent any new responses to migration drivers. Rather, EU policies on migration after the Arab Spring reaffirmed old positions regarding Mediterranean migration – in particular, controlling the external borders of Europe. Acknowledging the frustrations of the youth which partly brought about the Arab Spring, the EU has started to facilitate mobility by increasing slots available for university scholarships and exchanges in Erasmus Mundus, and by discussing Mobility Partnerships with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. However, the partnership has been declined by Egypt, and other countries are so far unwilling or unable to accept such agreements as they presently stand.

Currently, EU funding for countries in the Southern Mediterranean is based on a ‘more-for-more’ approach. The more a country democratically reforms, the more support they receive. EU Member States are also funding governments south of the Mediterranean through Arab States’ implementation of readmission agreements and through a Regional Protection Programme in North Africa. The EU and its Member States are keen to make sure that this funding is not diverted for repression of citizens. Given that newly forming regimes have never experienced managing nation-states, the promotion of democracy could become jeopardized if support for border control results in strengthening forces of repression thereby fomenting conditions for continued strife.
Introduction

The Arab spring has already brought considerable changes and more is to come. Being triggered for the first time in recent Arab history by social movements, political changes, in the long-term, can be expected to produce overall effects on migration: on movements of people, on the perception of migration-related issues by opinions and states, and on policies in all migration-related matters. Change will certainly take place, but no one can predict which direction and magnitude it will have.

If revolts end up with the establishment of regimes that are responsive to peoples’ demands and install trust, economically and politically, one can expect emigration to gradually slacken and even some return migration to take place. The opposite movement must be expected if revolts stall and fail to provide political freedoms and economic security. Moreover, it is impossible to anticipate how governments to be established will deal with migration-related issues.

This paper will provide a statistical assessment of migration before and after the uprisings, and will review European and Arab state policies regarding migration in order to encourage the factoring of migration within European policies post-Arab Spring. Additionally, the paper will present first-hand accounts from the Migration Policy Centre’s (MPC)collaborative surveys on migration after the Arab Spring in Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (although, at the time of writing, these surveys are not fully available).

Migration from Arab States on the Eve of Uprisings

Large scale emigration from Mediterranean Arab countries\(^1\) started four to five decades ago. When revolts broke out at the end of 2010, the region was source to almost 8 million first-generation migrants; 62% of them were living in an EU member state, 27% in another Arab state (20% in the Gulf) and 11% in another part of the world (Table 1). By world standards, most of these countries were above average senders of international migrants with first-generation emigrants representing between more than 2% of the total population in Syria and 12% in Lebanon, compared with a 3% world average. Libya, a major receiver of international migrants, was the only country with a small percentage of emigration (1% of its population).

Strikingly, the period immediately preceding the revolts was one of intense emigration in most of these countries. From 2001 to 2010, their aggregate number of emigrants to the OECD countries increased by 42%, from 3.5 to almost 5 million (Fig. 1). In sharp contrast with the common idea that international migration has become globalised, the lion’s share of the increase in Arab emigration to OECD countries between 2001 and 2010 has been destined to Europe (91%; see Fig. 2) and particularly to the three closest neighbours of the Arab states: Spain, Italy and France (Fig. 3). In the first two countries, low- or mid-skilled migrants were attracted by jobs left vacant by natives in conjunction with booming economies and rapidly rising standards of living. In France, however, the oldest country of immigration to Europe, the recent increase in Arab immigration was mainly due to family reunification.

It must be noted that non-OECD countries, in particular the Gulf States and other Arab states, are not included in statistics on changes between 2001 and 2010. Several sources indicate that while strong policies of nationalisation of employment in the Gulf failed and the proportion of foreign-nationals in the workforce dramatically increased between 2001 and 2010 in all Gulf States in spite of

\(^1\)This paper deals with the following countries, from West to East: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria.
these policies, Arabs were largely outnumbered by Asians in recent migration flows to the Gulf (with the exception of Egyptians in Saudi Arabia).²

Morocco was, at the same time, the largest and fastest growing sender of migrants to OECD countries with 1,447,486 migrants in 2001 and 2,341,093 migrants in 2010 (i.e. an increase of 62% in 10 years). Although in smaller numbers, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and very significantly Libya also experienced a steady increase of their emigration to the OECD (Fig. 3). All of the above countries except Algeria were about to become the scene of massive uprisings in 2011. The same factors that had produced emigration—the frustration of young people faced with unemployment, low rewards to education, state authoritarianism and lack of fundamental freedoms—were now triggering protest.

Did emigration play any role in the political and social movements that were to shake the Arab countries starting from 2011? If one regards emigration as an alternative to protest—an ‘exit’ instead of ‘voice’ response to discontent and frustration, according to Albert Hirschman’s model³—then one must acknowledge that emigration did not bring the prosperity that would have reduced the economic roots of revolts. Indeed, on the one hand, flows of migrant workers were small in comparison with those of new entrants on the labour market and emigration hardly lessened the pressure exerted by unemployed and under-employed young people. And on the other hand, if remittances certainly enhanced the social status of migrants’ families, it remains doubtful whether they were able to fuel sustainable development in the origin country. Actually, there are no convincing success stories of emigration-based development at the national level in Arab countries.

If migration was not a decisive agent of economic change, then did it contribute to political change and play a role in the uprisings? Much emphasis has been put on iconic figures of migrants and exiles who returned to their country at the very beginning of the movement and played a key role in subsequent civil or political developments, from Egypt’s blogger Wael Ghoneim to Tunisia’s President Moncef Marzouki. Moreover, models and values migrants have been exposed to in their destination country may have worked behind the scenes in shaping political opinions and ideologies, through a mechanism commonly described as social, or ideational, remittances. From this point of view, migrants’ destination probably matters. Schematically, one can speculate that migrants to Gulf States are potential vectors of dissemination of Wahhabi or Salafi models that prevail in the host society, while migrants to the West may convey secular values to their origin countries. For transfers to operate in the expected direction, however, migrants must be well integrated in the society of their destination country. Failed integration may act otherwise and produce the rejection of mainstream values and models of the host society.

A Mediterranean region in which migration from the southern shore would preferentially go to Arab oil states and no longer head for the northern shore would be a dangerously bipolar region. Surveys in several Arab countries have recurrently evidenced young peoples’ dreams of having a migratory experience and their preference for the West over the Gulf, if opportunities are given to them.⁴ In the light of the Arab Spring and for the sake of the stability and shared prosperity sought for by Europe, migration should be regarded as the strongest bridge between the two contrasted shores of the Mediterranean.

Long standing histories of emigration had led Arab Mediterranean countries to consider themselves as migrant-senders rather than receivers. However, viewed from the South and the East, these countries would appear before the uprisings as relatively rich and safe. They would attract migrants

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and refugees from their African and Middle Eastern neighbours faced with dire under-development and/or torn by civil and military conflicts. However, because governments were not willing or simply not prepared to incorporate large numbers of foreign-nationals, irregularity grew in parallel with immigration. It was estimated on the eve of the uprisings that around 4.5 million first-generation, temporary or long-term, immigrants were living in the Arab Mediterranean countries, with two-thirds of them in irregular situation regarding stay or, more often, work (Table 2).

Three different categories of immigrants were found in the region. Migrant workers were the largest group, including many workers in the informal sector who were not eligible for a work permit and were therefore in irregular situation. Refugees were the second largest group including a majority of de facto refugees, i.e. persons in need of protection according to criteria set by International Refugee Law but who could not, or would not wish to, be recognised as refugees in the country where they found shelter. The third and much smaller group is composed of transit migrants, i.e. persons initially bound for Europe but stuck at its external border for lack of entry visa.

Libya was the largest migrant-receiver in the region. In conjunction with several economic downturns, linked to international sanctions or fluctuating oil prices, the number and status of migrants in Libya have always been unstable and punctuated by recurrent and sometimes massive deportations. Syria and Jordan would come next, with large yet indefinite numbers of Iraqi refugees hosted as temporary ‘guests’, meaning that they were not granted the status of refugees and, therefore, not protected and denied access to the labour market and basic services. Lebanon was also host to Iraqi refugees in smaller numbers, but above all to a sizeable workforce from Syria, often employed without a work permit. Egypt was host to migrants and refugees from Sudan and the Horn of Africa, many of them with no residence permits. Finally, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia had recently become significant receivers of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, composing a mixed population of undocumented workers, unrecognised refugees and transit migrants.

Migrants, and particularly those in irregular situations who have often no choice but to hide and live in limbo, would become a population at risk when uprisings broke out. For lack of updates information, this paper will not bring all the attention this critical issue deserves.

Migration movements from and to the Arab countries since the beginning of the uprisings

Did social and political movements in the Arab countries produce an impact on structural, economic migration and would such an impact be observable one year and a half after they started? Regarding emigration, did the revolts result in increasing outflows from these countries, or on the contrary did they raise hopes of better governance and translate into some movement of return from the diasporas? Regarding immigration, did they lower the appeal of these countries of migrant workers, refugees and transit migrants? At the time of writing, statistical information on migration after the onset of the Arab spring is extremely scanty and does not allow for a full response to these questions. However, it gives clues that former trends simply continued.

Only four EU countries provide annual statistics of (legal) immigrant stocks by country of nationality until 1 January 2012: Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. In all of them, migrant stocks from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria have been increasing in 2011. But looking at the trend over the last five years, no particular break was observed in 2011 (Fig. 4). The annual increase in total migrant stocks from these was 90,839 in 2011 as compared with 67,214 in 2010 and 111,738 in 2009. Moreover, 72% of the increase in 2011 is due to migrant flows from Morocco alone, a country where street demonstrations remained of limited magnitude and resulted in a smooth political shift rather than a revolution. In relative terms, it is the Egyptian emigration that has increased the most between 2007 and 2011: by 19% in Germany, 22% in the UK, 45% in Spain and 58% in Italy (Fig. 4). But it has evenly increased with no particular surge in 2011.
The same applies to all six Arab states. From data available at the time of writing, one can conclude that Arab revolts did not produce any change in former trends of legal migration to Europe.

If Arab revolts did not affect regular emigration to Europe, did they provoke a surge in irregular border crossing to Europe? Just after the revolution started in both countries, Tunisia and Libya became points of departure for boats smuggling scores of migrants and refugees into Italy. Between January and September 2011, 42,807 persons were recorded as entering illegally Italy by sea (most of them disembarked in the Island of Lampedusa whose population is only 4,500 people) compared with less than 5,000 in 2010 and less than 10,000 in 2009, and an annual average of 18,788 in the preceding decade (Table 3). In order to diagnose the situation, three remarks must be made: first, most illegal crossings took place in Spring 2011, when police forces were disorganised and coastal control was inexistent in Tunisia; second, many non-Tunisians (18,451, i.e. 47% of the total), including more than 17,000 Sub-Saharan Africans (17,342) were smuggled into Italy together with Tunisians in 2011; and third, illegal entries into Italy peaking in 2011 were concomitant with their decrease in Malta and Spain to such an extent that, if all three countries are considered together, unauthorised entries occurred in larger numbers in 1999, 2006 and 2008 than in 2011 (Fig. 5).

The above facts suggest that: firstly, part of the 29,685 unauthorised Tunisian migrants recorded at entry in Italy in 2011 decided to cross in relation with an opportunity (no border control) more than in response to a structural change (the revolution) that was just starting at that time; secondly, irregular migrants who would otherwise have taken another route (such as crossing from Senegal, Mauritania or Morocco to Spain) took the same opportunity. Revolutions would have, therefore, rerouted existing flows of irregular migration more than stimulated new ones.

While Arab revolts did not produce any significant inflow of new migrants to Europe, neither regular nor irregular, apart from a short-lived movement of peoples smuggled from Tunisia in the first days of the revolution, events in Libya and in Syria resulted in considerable population displacement. In the spring and summer 2011, an estimated 1,128,985 people fled war-torn Libya to Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan, but also Italy and Malta. They belonged to three categories (Tab. 4).

The first category was comprised of 422,912 Libyans seeking shelter in a neighbouring African country; most of whom are believed to have returned to Libya when the war finished in the autumn 2011. The second category was comprised of migrant workers from all over the world, particularly from Arab and Sub-Saharan neighbours of Libya; they represent a large yet indeterminate part of the 706,073 foreign-nationals recorded as leaving Libya during the events. The third category is made up of de facto refugees, i.e. persons in need of protection who were living and working in Libya but not registered as refugees because Libya, not a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention, does not recognise the status of refugees. These persons had come from Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad and other countries in Africa; it is probable that many of them could not return to their homes and found themselves stranded in Egypt, Tunisia or Algeria.

For people fleeing Libya, the travel back home or to a country of asylum was more often than not a distressful experience. But, there is no doubt that the most unsafe route was the journey across the Mediterranean to Europe. While there are no records of large numbers of people dying while travelling in the opposite direction away from Libya across the Sahara, around 1,500 migrants and asylum seekers drowned in the Mediterranean on their way from Libya to Europe during the first half of 2011.

The second refugee crisis triggered by the Arab Spring started in Syria during the summer 2011, and took momentum in 2012. At the time of writing, no one could say how it will develop. On June 7th, their number was estimated at 115,117 by UNHCR, all of them hosted by a neighbouring country (with the exception of Israel); 72,874 were assisted by UNHCR, and an estimated 42,243 by the receiving states, NGOs or local populations. While no refugee movement towards Europe had apparently taken place, a communication of the European Commission, Communication on the functioning of the Schengen area [Com(2012) 230 Final, 16 May 2012] noted that: “the situation in Syria may prompt a future migration flow into the neighbouring countries, and also into the European
Union. In October-December 2011, 578 Syrians were detected while attempting to cross the Schengen external land border between the official border crossing points, compared to 210 persons in the same quarter of 2010. 82% of these were detected at the Greek external land border.5

Migration Governance in the Northern and Southern Mediterranean Since 2011

The first reaction of the EU was to regard the unfolding revolutions in the Mediterranean as a unique political opportunity, not only for the Arab peoples, but also for the Mediterranean region and for Europe’s multifaceted links with these countries. In the backdrop of the revolutions, the EU and several Member States rapidly expanded their Mediterranean focus from development to the promotion of democracy. Less than two months after Ben Ali fled Tunisia, the European Commission, in its communication entitled A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean Countries, offered a ‘more-for-more’ approach linking its financial support to democratic reforms. According to this incentive-based approach, “those that go further and faster with reforms will be able to count on greater support from the EU.”6 At the onset, the EU committed significant funding to support democratic transitions.

One of the strongest proposals, the EU-Tunisia Task Force, was meant to provide 4 billion Euros to support democratic transition between 2011 and 2013 (EU-Jordan and EU-Egypt Task Force will be created in 2012). The Support for Partnership Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme (created in September 2011) also foresees 350 million Euros to support democratic transformation and sustainable growth. In Morocco, assistance for development and democratic reforms was increased by 20% to 580.5 million Euros. Furthermore, the EU budget for the Neighbourhood (South and East) is proposed to be massively increased by 40% to 18.1 billion Euros. European States also played an important political role at the UN in post-crisis Libya and Syria, and they continue to play a role.

One of the underlying expectations of this renewed focus on democracy is that, in the long-term, a stable Mediterranean leads to less migration and better managed migration. As an incentive for countries to democratize, enhanced mobility has been offered to those who reform. Therefore, enhanced mobility will be offered for those who democratise which in the end leads to less migration and more secure migration. The link between EU democratising policies and migration is found in A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of a European Neighbourhood Policy, which stipulates that: “Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law…This enhanced support will come in various forms, including…greater facilitation of mobility.”7

Although new emphasis and great effort was dedicated to democracy-building, the EU did not invent any new responses to short-term migratory movements or long-term migration. Rather, EU policies on migration after the Arab Spring reaffirmed old positions regarding Mediterranean migration. Moreover, in reaction to a short-lived movement from Tunisia, some Member States questioned the ability of the Schengen Treaty to adequately monitor migration flows into Europe.8 The EU has been developing these long-standing external dimensions of its migration policies since the last decade. The Stockholm Programme in 2009 offered a vision further developed by The Global

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). The GAMMs framework, in which specific policies targeting Mediterranean countries takes place, includes four pillars: legal migration and mobility; irregular migration and trafficking in human beings; international protection and asylum policy; and maximising the development impact of migration and mobility. This approach to migration was not affected by the Arab Spring, and so far, most EU efforts, post-revolutions, have been dedicated to the second pillar.

The Arab Spring raised fears of an exodus of irregular migrants and unwanted migration and these fears swiftly resulted in European States placing their efforts on strengthening border control and on pressuring readmission agreements. Due to its proximity to the crises in Tunisia and Libya, Italy was (in Europe) the most exposed to migratory flows. In order to address the risk of a large number of unwanted migrants reaching Italy and the tiny island of Lampedusa, on 20 February 2011, FRONTEX Joint Operation Hermes began monitoring the seas of the Mediterranean. In March 2011, the Italian interior minister, Roberto Maroni, said that flows of migrants from Libya would bring Italy “to its knees.” The Foreign Affairs Minister Franco Frattini talked of 200,000-300,000 arrivals, creating a future that was “impossible to imagine.” Frattini warned that the fall of Qaddafi’s regime could lead to “an exodus of Biblical proportions”. Likewise, “Muammar Gaddafi warned that if he fell: ‘You will have immigration, thousands of people from Libya will invade Europe. There will be no-one to stop them any more.’”

Without waiting for the creation of an official government, in June 2011, Italy signed a Cooperation Accord with the then rebel National Transitional Council, agreeing to share information on illegal immigration and cooperation on repatriating migrants. Furthermore, the rebels agreed to honour several accords signed between Italy and Gadafi, including the deportation of irregular immigrants without proper status. The latest development in this constant policy came on 3 April 2012, when a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on security was signed between the two countries to combat the unauthorized departures of migrants from Libya. The MoU provided Libyan police forces with training and technical tools for controlling the border; proposed mechanisms for information sharing on irregular migrants and illegal smuggling networks; and proposed construction of a detention centre in Kufra for irregular migrants. Moreover, the MoU stated the urgency of obtaining necessary support from the European Commission for reopening the detention centre.

In the same vein, but in a completely different political context, Tunisia and Italy signed a Cooperation Accord in April 2011, described by Maroni as: “a bilateral technical cooperation accord to counter illegal immigration and to strengthen collaboration between the two countries’ police forces; repatriations are also envisaged”. The readmission of migrants was also tackled by EU

15 Processo verbale della riunione tra il Ministro dell’interno della Repubblica Italiana ed il Ministro dell’interno della Libia 3 Aprile 2012
President Barroso during his visit to Tunisia in the same month whereby he proposed extra financial assistance (140 million Euros) to the Tunisian authorities for their cooperation on readmission of Tunisians and prevention of irregular migration. He claimed that: “Emigration is not the solution to the economic challenges of this country. The long-term solution is economic and social development based on the talents and energy of the Tunisian people.”

It is significant that, originally proposed in 2010, the Visa Information System (VIS), a database which allows the exchange of visa data between Member States, launched specifically in the Arab countries where the revolutions began, and not elsewhere. “The launch of the Visa Information System (VIS) on 11 October 2011 has proved successful in the first region of deployment (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia).”

The causes of the Arab Spring originated not only in the quest for freedom and dignity, but also in the demands for greater economic well-being. However, the initial economic outcome of the revolution cannot be considered positive. Entire sectors of the economies of countries subjected to revolts, in particular Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, have been collapsing, and unemployment and underemployment have increased. Migration certainly is not a solution, but it can and could be part of the response.

Unfortunately, the global context is no longer favourable to migration. The preferred destinations of Arab migrants (to the West and the Gulf) are facing growing unemployment among their native populations and anti-immigration opinions are rising everywhere. In these destinations, however, migrants and natives are probably not always competing for the same jobs as labour markets are segmented, and perhaps when the crisis subsides, migrants will still be needed to fill certain segments of the economy - in particular, in rapidly ageing Europe. Moreover, the experience of Europe shows that when barriers are constructed, migrants and employers find a way to circumvent obstructions to mobility. Given this reality, and in order to prepare for the future, prescient leaders are needed to respond to the changes occurring in the Southern Mediterranean.

So far, the EU’s response has been to narrowly facilitate migration to the EU by increasing slots available for university scholarships and exchanges in Erasmus Mundus (increased programme funding by 30 million Euros in the 2011-2012 academic years). Four Mobility Partnerships have also been envisaged in the aftermath of the Arab Spring with Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Egypt. At the time of writing, progress on Mobility Partnerships are at different stages. Although Egypt has already declined the offer of a Mobility Partnership, the EU is entertaining the possibility of resuming discussion after Egyptian presidential elections. According to the MPC collaborative survey, however, Egypt’s rejection of the Mobility Partnership could be because migration, which before the revolution was a matter of policy-making with a special Ministry, has since disappeared from the political discourse and is no longer regarded a policy priority.

In October 2011, Dialogues for Mobility Partnerships were also launched in Tunisia and Morocco; however, views of what cooperation on migration should be are not entirely shared by both sides of the Mediterranean. In January 2012, Tunisia outlined priorities for a Mobility Partnership which

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19 “Mobility Partnerships will be offered to the EU’s immediate Neighbourhood and to Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt in the first instance. Mobility partnerships offer a concrete framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and non-EU countries. These partnerships are focused on facilitating and organizing legal migration, effective and humane measures to address irregular migration, and concrete steps towards reinforcing the development outcomes of migration. Concluding visa facilitation and readmission agreements are to be part of these partnerships.” Stronger cooperation and mobility at the centre of the renewed eu migration strategy. (2011, November 18). Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1369&type=HTML
differs vastly from that of the EU: job opportunities for Tunisians; recognition of skills/diplomas; reforming the Tunisian education system in order to meet the requirements of the EU labour market; promoting migrant’s fundamental rights; integration into the receiving society; and visa facilitation inclusion of merchants, civil servants, and family members of migrants in Europe. Under the chapter of irregular migration, Tunisia also suggests that the EU develop disadvantaged regions in Tunisia and assist migrants who voluntarily decide to return from Europe.\(^{20}\)

Further demonstrating the contrast between Northern and Southern Mediterranean views, the MPC collaborative survey in Morocco found that Migration and Mobility Partnerships are viewed as a means for the EU to have readmission agreements with Morocco, with no real will to manage economic migration and mobility. A senior official of Hassan II Foundation for Moroccan Expatriates stated that: “either Europe seriously addresses the real challenge, which is the economic development of Morocco, or it will be flooded by our migrants.”\(^{21}\) Another senior official from Morocco, furthermore, questioned readmission agreements within Mobility Partnerships, asking: “Why should a country like Morocco, the last stop before ‘the European Eldorado’, take all the responsibility? [...] Morocco thinks readmission should be part of overall migration policy.”\(^{22}\)

In regards to migration governance in Arab states before the Arab Spring, emigration and maintaining links with citizens abroad were significant economic and political concerns for most countries in the Southern Mediterranean. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon all developed government ministries and organisations specifically designed to maintain links with their citizens abroad, particularly to encourage development of the homeland through remittances.\(^{23}\) Political participation of citizens abroad, however, was encouraged less so (or not at all) before the Arab Spring as many governments were distrustful of the diaspora, especially as many political opponents had formed opposition groups abroad.

Although much of the above existed in the Arab countries before the Arab Spring, certain countries developed relationships with their citizens abroad more concretely after the revolutions. In Morocco, a national referendum in July 2011 brought about a new constitution which included several articles regarding emigration and continuation of diaspora links. In particular, the new constitution: encourages the reinforcement of citizens’ contribution to Morocco’s development and strengthening of ties between Morocco/receiving county (Article 16); granting full rights of citizenship (right to be electors/exercice of the right to vote and of candidature from the countries of residence) (Article 17); and encourages participation in the consultative institutions and institutions of good governance (Article 18 and 163).\(^{24}\)

Likewise, political parties in Tunisia are all in favour of greater political participation for Tunisians abroad (the only reservation, by Ennahda, being that Tunisians abroad should not be able to apply for


\(^{23}\) Algeria: Consultative Council for the National Community Abroad; Egypt: Ministry of Manpower and Migration; Lebanon: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Lebanese Expatriates Abroad; Morocco: Council of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad (CMCE); Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad; Tunisia: Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE). CARIM Migration Profiles, by country, retrieved from: http://www.carim.org/index.php?callContent=502

\(^{24}\) http://www.scribd.com/mmissouri/d/58123149-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AE%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%AC%D8%AF%D8%B3%D8%AF-2011
the State Presidency). As demonstrated by the MPC collaborative survey in Tunisia, furthermore, the
government has a strong interest in linking with Tunisians abroad and has taken several measures to
reinforce this connection. Notably, in 2011, and for the first time, Tunisian expatriates were offered
participation in the parliamentary elections with 18 seats reserved for their representation.25 In October
2011, the government also created a State Secretariat for Tunisian Expatriates. One of its first
initiatives was to conduct a survey among Tunisian consulates on clandestine migrants, in particular
those missing or dead during the crossing in order to find those missing, help those who have been
detained, and to support their families. Likewise, the government is reforming existing institutions
(Office des Tunisiens à l’Etranger) and creating new ones (“Haut Conseil des Tunisiens à l’étranger”,
“Agence de la Migration et du Développement”, “Observatoire National de la Migration”) primarily
for the sake of development through migration. As development remains a concern, the Tunisian
government insists on revising migration agreements with European states in order to link actions to
prevent irregular migration with measures to boost development.26

Although most of the discourse in Egypt has primarily revolved around internal politics (especially
as the interim military rulers, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, have become increasingly
assertive in political affairs), many political figures interviewed or mentioned in the MPC
collaborative survey in Egypt underlined the necessity for Egyptian migration abroad, in particular for
reconstruction and development of Egypt through migration.27

Libya, on the contrary, a country of immigration as opposed to emigration, historically had an
open-door policy on the labour market (foreign nationals welcome as workers) but closed door with
regard to social inclusion. Migrants and refugees in Libya enjoyed few rights and frequent violations
and denials of basic rights occurred. Although Libyan elections are scheduled for 7 July 2012, the
interim leaders, the National Transitional Council, have officially mentioned migration policies which
diverge from the Libyan government’s actions in the past. In its eight-point plan for rebuilding the
nation, A Vision of a Democratic Libya, the NTC highlighted that: “The interests and rights of foreign
nationals and companies will be protected. Immigration, residency and citizenship will be managed by
government institutions, respecting the principles and rights of political asylum and public liberties.”28

The Syrian government, which has refused so far to relinquish power - through elections or
otherwise - has also extended certain rights related to migration in the 2012 Constitution. Whereas
Article 33 of the 1973 Constitution granted that: “A citizen may not be deported from the homeland,”
Article 38 of the 2012 Constitution extends to Syrian citizens the right to return and recognises the
right to leave the country: “Every citizen shall have the right to move in or leave the territory of the
state, unless prevented by a decision from the competent court.”29

Migration Policy Centre - European University Institute.

26 Ibid.

27 Hafez, H., & Ghaly, A. (2012). The effect of the arab spring on migration flows in egypt. Forthcoming, Migration Policy
Centre - European University Institute and Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, The American University in Cairo,
Cairo, Egypt.

28 Statement of the National Transitional Council (2011). A vision for a democratic libya. Retrieved from website:
http://www.ntclibya.org/english/libya/

29 Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), (2012). Draft constitution for the syrian arab republic. Retrieved from website:
http://www.sana.sy/eng/337/2012/02/25/401178.htm
Tackling Refugee Movements from Libya and Syria: The Role of Europe, Neighbouring Arab States and Turkey

The EU’s response to refugee outflows from Libya was, on the one hand, to encourage Member States to assist refugees with humanitarian aid and asylum while also, on the other hand, implement “measures …to prevent large numbers of irregular migrants, often exploited by unscrupulous criminal networks, from arriving in the EU.” On the backdrop of mounting civil war in Libya and subsequent outflows of migrants and refugees crossing its land borders, the European Commission’s Communication on Migration [COM(2011) 248 final] in May 2011, acknowledged that 650,000 persons had fled Libya, and that the EU had responded to the crisis by repatriating 50,000 third country nationals to their countries of origin and providing humanitarian assistance to refugees in North Africa in the amount of 80.5 million Euros. Likewise a year later, the EU would propose a Commission Special Measure to reserve 23 million Euros to partly fund Syrian refugees.

In December 2011, amidst the political changes taking place, the European Commission opened a Regional Protection Programme (RPP) in North Africa – specifically, in Egypt, Tunisia (and when possible Libya). RPPs are designed to offshore the management of refugee crises outside the borders of Europe in proximity to refugees’ countries of origin. Furthermore, “Resettlement of refugees in Member States will be essential in order to reinforce the partnership component of programmes.” However, in May 2011, the European Commission tried to convince Member States that: “it is important for EU Member States to accept to resettle some of these persons,” regarding refugees from the Arab Spring. Actually, Europe resettled only 700 refugees in 2011. In reflection to this response to the refugee crisis, Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, addressed Harvard University in April 2012 by stating that: “no European State took any serious initiative to provide shelter on its own soil to those in need of international protection…Instead of solidarity among Member States, France and Italy quarreled about possible risks for their internal security, with France even reinforcing controls at the internal border with Italy. So, instead of reaching out and protecting, the EU Member States were inward-looking and security oriented.”

As mentioned, much larger numbers of migrants did not pose a direct challenge to Europe, but to neighbouring African neighbours of Libya as more than one million people fleeing war in Libya crossed into Tunisia and Egypt, as well as Algeria, Sudan, Niger, and Chad. These countries supported the bulk of the burden, even though Tunisia and Egypt were destabilised by their own revolutions. In response, Tunisia, and to a smaller extent also Egypt, maintained an open door policy, admitting over half a million migrants together with over half a million returning nationals. These movements created immense humanitarian concerns, yet neighbouring States took actions to deal with the crisis. As seen in Tunisia, migrants and refugees were taken care of by the army, and there was massive solidarity of the Tunisian population which provided basic needs which were further strengthened by swift and

31 Ibid.
efficient mobilisation of local NGOs that worked to lessen the burden. These countries and their citizens made an enormous effort to host those fleeing the violence and to give protection. The IOM (funded by the EU 9.9 million Euros) is also strengthening the capacity of Libya to manage migration and is providing services to returning Tunisians and Egyptians and other third-country nationals who fled Libya after the revolution.\(^{36}\)

While most Libyan refugees in Tunisia have now returned to Libya, several thousand Libyans, probably close to the former regime, are still in Tunisia. Some sub-Saharan Africans who fled Libya into Tunisia also have no prospect for returning to their homes.\(^{37}\)

Will the same story repeat itself in Syria, a year after Libya? Neighbouring Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon (and to a smaller extent Iraq), have also taken in Syrian refugees fleeing the violence created by the revolution and subsequent civil war in Syria. Tens of thousands of Syrians have fled the violence, and estimates of actual numbers are most likely underestimated (the MPC collaborative survey in Lebanon found that many Syrian refugees do not want to be registered for fear that names are transmitted by the Lebanese government to the Syrian government).\(^{38}\)

Even though these neighboring Arab States and Turkey face their own unique political and social challenges: “They have all maintained an open borders policy for Syrian refugees.”\(^{39}\) Assisting with this crisis, UNHCR and other global and local NGOs are working to provide basic needs support and essential services; however, services are increasingly limited, especially as the UNs appeal for $84 million to help Syrian refugees has gone unmet.\(^{40}\) Furthermore, access to basic needs and services is available unevenly throughout countries of asylum. Other services are only budgeted for a certain number of refugees (See Table 5).

As discovered in the MPC collaborative surveys on Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, Syrian refugees are in serious need of housing, and access to health, education and cash, as savings are dwindling.\(^{41}\) In Lebanon, civil society plays a critical role in providing for Syrian refugees - in particular, in the North where a coalition of 28 charity organisations, mostly Islamist, has provided assistance to refugees.

Syrian refugees also experience exile differently depending upon which country they reside. In Turkey, refugees are grouped into camps and the Turkish language presents a barrier for native Arabic speakers. Although relatives provide support in Lebanon and Jordan, both countries are strained with the recent influxes of Iraqi refugees from the US-led invasion as well as previous flows of Palestinian refugees. Both Lebanon and Iraq are also facing political instability, and, in Lebanon, part of this instability is related to the years of Syrian involvement within the country.

The MPC collaborative survey in Lebanon found that the Syrian refugee crisis is now starting to impact the fragile political balance in Lebanon. The split between the regime and the opposition in

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\(^{40}\) So far, only twenty per cent of the funding has been fulfilled. Cited from: Un food agency scales up assistance to reach 250,000 syrians. (2012, April 24). *UN News Centre.* Retrieved from http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41848&Cr=Syria&Crl

Syria is reflected by a crack within the Lebanese government between pro- and anti-Syrian regime. The Lebanese government is opposed to setting up camps for the Syrian refugees, because that would make them visible and ignite tensions that are in the latent state in Lebanese society, especially as Syrian refugees have brought the conflict inside Lebanese borders. In Tripoli in May 2012, the presence of Syrian refugees triggered communal clashes between two neighbourhoods, Bab El-Tebbaneh (which is Sunni and hostile to the Syrian government) and Jabal Mohsen (which is Alawite and supports the Syrian government).42

Migration related challenges likely to follow the Arab Spring

For the last decade, the drivers of migration from the Southern Mediterranean have included: unemployment and underemployment, especially of educated youth; wage differentials between the North and South; the attractiveness of Europe in regards to gaining skills and education; the desire to live within European cultures and lifestyles; and for family reunification. Post-Arab Spring, these reasons for migrating have not vanished; they have, perhaps, only intensified due to the increased volatility and uncertainty in the region.

As revolutions begin to subside, for the moment, and as elections are taking place throughout the Arab World, it will become necessary for newly emerging governments to consolidate their regimes. Forming new governments, given the long histories of tyranny and dictatorship, will be difficult, and many leaders in the Arab World (as well as citizens) have little experience with democracy, let alone Islamic democracy, whatever this may be defined as. Countries which have recently experienced revolts are now left with inexperienced leaders who will be called upon to govern economies, social issues, and foreign policy at a nation-state level (all while forming their states’ versions of democracy – endeavours which have so far been applauded by the West, yet sometimes undemocratic in their implementation). With history as teacher, the past shows that revolutions tend to be followed by years, and sometimes decades, of instability. Therefore, the above migratory pressures may increase during this time period.

Instability caused by the Arab Spring has also had a devastating impact on the economies of the region. Although Libyan oil production has resumed and as Egypt remains a producer of natural gas, other sectors of the economies throughout the North Africa and the Middle East have disintegrated. In 2010, Egypt’s tourist industry, the pillar of its economy, brought approximately $13.6 billion in revenues;43 in 2011 the country received only $9 billion, dropping approximately 35 per cent.44 Syria is currently embroiled in a civil war which has claimed the lives of 12,000 people, and has been placed under economic sanctions by Western and Arab governments. Syria’s economy has been affected, and the road to recovery appears long. Instability throughout the region, moreover, frightens foreign investors who will be needed to help stabilize these economies.

For the most part, migration has become a non-topic in public debates in the Arab countries - regime and state consolidation, and economic and social issues have taken precedence. In this environment, migration policy takes a backseat to ‘bread-and-butter’ issues – migration management, therefore, becomes secondary. Moreover, as demonstrated by MPC collaborative survey in Morocco, current EU attempts at migration management – Mobility Partnerships – are unattractive to Arab leaders in their current form, and migration will most likely continue with or without such a management tool.

Libya, which has been a country of immigration for hundreds of thousands of Tunisians, Egyptians and Sub-Saharan Africans (and less so South-East Asians and Eastern Europeans), has been attracting migrants again. However, the situation in the country could produce new outflows if the country destabilizes further. Currently, elections have been postponed until 7 July 2012, and the interim government faces several complex issues: a vacuum of experienced leaders accustomed to tribal loyalties to rule the country; the increased weaponization of tribes and society during the revolution; growing terrorist elements throughout the country; and violent tribal disputes which disobey the respect of human rights. Due to their own internal conflicts, Libya’s neighbours – Mali, the Horn of Africa and Chad – could also produce more refugees creating additional refugee movements in the Southern Mediterranean.

Refugee outflows could also continue, as they have been, if the Syrian government insists on perpetrating violence against its citizens. Lebanon and Jordan, and to a lesser extent Turkey, are strained with previous refugee flows from Iraq, and Iraq is still recuperating and stabilizing after the US-led invasion and subsequent civil war. The refugee situation could become extremely difficult for these countries of first asylum, and people may seek safety elsewhere.

Factoring the Arab Spring in European Migration Policies

One and a half years after the onset of the uprisings south of the Mediterranean, four facts could help reorient migration policies: 1) the Arab Spring presents a monumental opportunity for Europe’s neighbourhood to engage in a virtuous circle of human progress - an opportunity European states do not want to miss; 2) the Arab Spring and emigration are linked by common determinants, in particular intense frustration of young people increasingly educated but at the same time denied agency and acceptable futures; 3) migration to Europe has not been accelerated by the Arab Spring, but has simply continued along previous trends despite the economic crisis in the receiving countries; and 4) the events in the Arab World have produced two major refugee crises in Europe’s neighbourhood, and mounting violence should be expected to intensify refugee flows.

Acknowledging these facts, what could more effectual policy-making on migration in the Southern Mediterranean be in the future? Firstly, the EU could consider that the same principles apply to diplomacy and democracy promotion on the one hand, and to migration management policies on the other hand.

Currently, a tension exists between the EUs heightened focus on democracy promotion and the EU’s and EU Member States’ external aspects of migration policy. On the one hand, EU funding for countries in the Southern Mediterranean is based on a ‘more-for-more’ approach. The more a country democratically reforms, the more support they receive. The EU claims that the European Union and its Member States:

“needs to support wholeheartedly the wish of the people in our neighbourhood to enjoy the same freedoms that we take as our right …This new [‘more-for-more’] approach should be rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values. The demand for political participation, dignity, freedom and employment opportunities expressed in recent weeks can only be addressed through faster and more ambitious political and economic reforms …The commitment to democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law must be shared.”

At the same time, however, the EU and its Member States are also funding Arab governments through Arab governments’ implementation of readmission agreements (and, as mentioned, the EU is also seeking to engage these newly forming governments in Mobility Partnerships with readmission as

45 MPC collaborative survey in Libya by Amal Obeidi, forthcoming.
a prerequisite) and through implementation of a Regional Protection Programme, regardless of how democratic these regimes may seem.

EU’s and Member States’ external migration policies, which are foremost concerned with safeguarding national security, will have to be consistent with efforts to promote stability through democracy and development in the Arab region. European States will not wish to repeat the mistakes of the past when they were courting undemocratic rulers for the sake of border control. In the past, in countries ruled by dictators, funding for border control meant more money for surveillance, ships, and guards which were in turn incorporated into the police for control over citizens. Controlling the border went hand in hand with the repression of citizens and the deportation of third-country nationals, often in violation of human rights.

The EU and its Member States are keen to make sure that funding for border control is also linked to democratic reforms if an “unambiguous commitment” to democracy is to be realized. They have to ensure that these policies will not backfire and produce unwanted side-effects. Given that newly forming regimes have never experienced managing nation-states, the promotion of democracy could become jeopardized if support for border control results in strengthening forces of repression thereby fomenting conditions for continued strife.

Further steps in migration management, in the light of the Arab Spring, could include the following:

- Southern Mediterranean countries should be a stable priority in the Global Approach to Migration and the EU neighbourhood policy due not only to their demographic size and dynamics, but also to their importance in the political stability of the Mediterranean;
- Migration profiles which cover the statistical, legal and socio-political of both inwards and outwards migration should be developed for the concerned countries and regularly updated; a consultative mechanism involving the concerned countries in the drafting process could be defined;
- The EU and its Member States should define mechanisms which ensure that support for border control is not diverted for repressing citizens and third-country nationals;
- Acknowledging that migration works better for the origin countries’ development when migrants are well-linked to these countries, the EU and its Member States should facilitate the two-way circulation of people –migrants themselves, their business relations, their family members—as MPC collaborative surveys show that this is a recurrent claim in the Arab countries.
- In light of the safeguards the Visa Information System (VIS) will provide, the circulation of people should be favoured at least for short-term stays of maximum 3 months in the Schengen area. As a clear political sign of its willingness to favour mobility in view of the conclusion of mobility partnerships, the EU should offer some visa facilitations without linking these to the issue of readmission, for instance regarding facilitations that can be implemented within the scope of the visa code, in particular the issue of multiple entry visas;
- The conclusion or the reinforcement of bilateral youth mobility agreements between the EU Member States and the concerned third countries should be encouraged;
- A right of access to the labour market should be given for a limited period of time to students coming from the concerned countries, after their completion of education in Europe, in order to gain a first professional experience in the EU;
- Research has shown that the better migrants are integrated in their host society, the more efficient they are in contributing to their home society’s development. In the same way, political participation granted to long-term migrants at local level in the host country may well bring ‘democratic remittances’ to the home country. The EU and its Member States should grant political participation for long-term migrants at the local level.
In the framework of the new Regional Protection Programme, the Member States should resume and engage more intensely in refugee resettlement as burden-sharing is currently insufficient and will become unpersuasive for countries to continue to collaborate with the EU if refugee flows continue to rise;

The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) should extend an early-warning mechanism of refugee crises in the region to support countries of first asylum in the Southern Mediterranean in order to anticipate the needs of the concerned countries and persons and to give advice about the help that the EU and its Member States can offer to the concerned third countries.
Appendix

Tables

Table 1. Migrants originating in Arab Mediterranean countries by region of residence - most recent data available in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Region of residence</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>In percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,390,174</td>
<td>92,522</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,475,662</td>
<td>56,310</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>516,440</td>
<td>20,308</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>43,646</td>
<td>10,947</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>199,153</td>
<td>226,661</td>
<td>578,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
<td>n.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>25,745</td>
<td>78,195</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>153,196</td>
<td>421,413</td>
<td>1,578,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>109,913</td>
<td>421,413</td>
<td>82,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,913,929</td>
<td>863,490</td>
<td>7,892,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: national censuses data compiled by A. di Bartolomeo for CARIM - migrants are defined as "foreign-born" or "non nationals" according to countries

Table 2. Immigration in Arab Mediterranean countries - most recent data available in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Immigrant stocks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>72,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>45,192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>1,449,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>362,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>992,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>702,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>742,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total AMC</td>
<td>4,470,911</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.: Not available

Sources: (1) Non-citizens or born-abroad residents according to most recent official records (census, permits of stay, survey); see Fargues, Ph. (ed.) Mediterranean Report 2008-2009, Appendix 7, p. 486. www.carim.org
### Table 3. Unauthorised arrivals by sea in Italy by country of declared nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All countries</th>
<th>Arab countries</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>20,143</td>
<td>7,849</td>
<td>12,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>23,719</td>
<td>9,263</td>
<td>14,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>14,331</td>
<td>5,096</td>
<td>9,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13,635</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>22,939</td>
<td>13,960</td>
<td>8,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>22,016</td>
<td>15,612</td>
<td>6,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20,165</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>36,951</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>9,573</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,406</td>
<td>2,092</td>
<td>2,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average 2001-2010</td>
<td>18,788</td>
<td>8,979</td>
<td>8,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011(*)</td>
<td>42,807</td>
<td>25,465</td>
<td>17,342</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) January-September 2011 only - Q4 is missing.

Source: Ministry of Interior

### Table 4. Persons fleeing Libya during Spring and Summer 2011 by nationality and country of shelter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Libyans seeking refuge abroad 1/</th>
<th>422,912</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants 2/</td>
<td>706,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisians returning to Tunisia</td>
<td>96,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptians returning to Egypt</td>
<td>140,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third country nationals reaching Tunisia or Egypt</td>
<td>292,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other migrants reaching an African country bordering Libya</td>
<td>148,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants and refugees of all nationalities fleeing from Libya to Italy or Malta</td>
<td>27,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Migrants + Libyans 3/</td>
<td>1,128,985</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1/ Arrivals of Libyans in Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria as of 08 June 2011
2/ Movements of non-Libyans as of 30 September 2011
3/ As of 30.09.2011 for Migrants and 08.06.2011 for Libyans

Source: IOM
### Table 5. Services Provided to Syrian Refugees in Countries of Asylum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Asylum</th>
<th>Location of Syrian Refugees</th>
<th>Limited Availability of Services</th>
<th>Provider(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Jordan            | Private homes (relatives/rented)  
Transit Facilities (Jordanian Gov.) | Protection  
• Shelter  
• Food  
• Health  
• Education | • Jordan Gov./UNHCR  
• Jordan Gov./UNHCR/Relatives or Rented  
• UNHCR/WFP  
• Jordanian MOH/Caritas/Jordan Health Aid Society/ International Medical Corps  
• Jordanian MOE/UNICEF |
| Lebanon           | Private homes (relatives/rented) | Protection  
• Shelter  
• Food  
• Health  
• Education | • Lebanese Gov./UNHCR  
• Norwegian Refugee Council – financial support to host families  
• HRC/Various Islamic Charities/UNICEF/ UNHCR  
• HRC/UNHCR/MSF/IMC  
• UNICEF/SCS |
| Iraq              | Private homes (relatives)  
Refugee Camp (Domiz Camp in Duhok) | • Protection  
• Shelter  
• Food  
• Health | • Iraq Gov./UNHCR  
• Iraqi MoDM/UNHCR/Relatives  
• Iraqi MoDM/Islamic Kurdistan League  
• Iraqi Dept. of Health |
| Turkey            | Refugee Camps (Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay and Sanliurfa, and Acce) | • Protection  
• Shelter  
• Food  
• Health  
• Education | All services provided by the Turkish Government and the Turkish Red Crescent Society |

*Source: UNHCR Update No. 8 Syria Regional Refugee Response Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey 07 June 2012*

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Figures

Figure 1: Migrants stocks from selected Arab countries in OECD countries in 2001 and 2010 - By country of origin

Source: OECD Database

Figure 2: Migrants stocks from selected Arab countries in OECD countries in 2001 and 2010 - By region of destination

Source: OECD Database

Figure 3: Changes between 2001 and 2010 in migrants stocks from Arab countries by EU country of destination

Source: National statistical offices of the countries of destination
Figure 4: Changes between 2007 and 2012 in migrant stocks from Arab Mediterranean countries in selected EU member states (Base 100 in 2007)

**Germany**
Source: Population Register

**Italy**
Source: ISTAT, Residence permits

**United Kingdom**
Ministry of Labour: Before entry visas issued per year

**Spain**
Source: Ministry of Labour, residence permits
Migration after the Arab Spring

**Figure 5: Arrivals of irregular migrants by sea in Italy, Spain and Malta by year, 1999-2011**

Source: Ministry of Interior (Italy and Spain); Frontexwatch (Malta)

**Figure 6: Migrants fleeing Libya in Spring and Summer 2011 by country of arrival**

Source: IOM

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Figure: Syrian refugees by country of asylum as of 7 June 2012 (Source: UNHCR)

- Registered with UNHCR
- Assisted by other organisations

- Turkey
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Iraq
- Total