Arab Society in Revolt
For the people of the Mediterranean, the early 2010s will be remembered as a period of great change. In the south, Arab citizens’ claims to fundamental freedoms and dignities have toppled—or at least seriously shaken—decades-old dictatorships, while in the north the market’s failures have confronted governments with an unprecedented crisis concerning the equally old and unsustainable production and welfare systems. The two crises, political in the south and economic in the north, have no common origins except that they are both partly rooted in the progressive, inexorable transformations brought about by demographic change.

Historians will certainly highlight the crises’ concomitance with a radical demographic turning point that is barely noticeable in real time, as shifts in population evolve slowly and therefore invisibly for those who focus on the short term. The period around 2010 will indeed be remembered as the time when the population of young adults peaked in the Arab world while an enduring population decline gained momentum in Europe. Demography offers a key to understanding changes that separately affect the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean while, at the same time, linking them together through international migration.

This chapter will, first, briefly review how demographic trends challenge Europe’s ambitious economic, social, and political goals and will ask to what extent immigration can help in addressing demographic challenges. The rest of the chapter focuses on Europe’s closest neighborhood, the Arab Mediterranean region, from which large flows of recent immigrants have originated. It describes the lack of economic prospects, political freedom, and individual
agency that young adults—more numerous but more excluded than ever—
suffer in the context of the powerful social changes that accompany such a
demographic shift, such as women's empowerment, the spread of education,
and, for the first time, the birth of the individual in societies that have been
based, since time immemorial, on families and communities.

The chapter then offers an interpretation of emigration and revolt as two
possible responses of the young, whose new aspirations are frustrated by the
patriarchal order of both the family and the polity, which largely negates indi-
viduals' aspirations. After recalling that Arab countries have their own "south"
and thus constitute a migrant receiving as well as a sending region, the chap-
ter finally examines what happened when migration and revolt met in the
course of 2011. By way of conclusion, it will speculate on the future of migration in relation to long-term demographic and short-term political changes
in the Arab region, as well as on the future of European policies regarding
Arab migration.

Generational Contracts at Risk

For the first time in history, Europe must prepare for a long-term decline in
population that will not be the result of wars or epidemics, as in the past, but
rather the outcome of individual choices freely made by its own people over
the last half century regarding procreation. Demographic recession cannot be
stopped unless the downward trend is offset by large-scale immigration.
Moreover, below-replacement fertility rates will combine with continuous
gains in life expectancy to produce unprecedented population aging. While
this process is potentially universal, it will affect Europe first and more acutely
than any other part of the world.

Europe's demographic recession will have three facets. The first will be a
shrinking Europe. While the total population of Europe will decrease or sta-
ibilize, depending upon migration scenarios, the number of people in most
other regions will continue to increase so that the relative weight of Europe in
world population terms will dwindle. Europe's closest neighbors will con-
tinue to follow their own demographic paths. For example, if the members of
the League of Arab States eventually accomplish the dream of its founders and
build one Arab nation, this nation will have 633 million inhabitants in 2050
(versus 357 million in 2010), whereas the twenty-seven member states of the
European Union (EU27) are projected to have only 448 million inhabitants in
2050 (versus 506 million in 2010) if no immigration takes place.²
The second facet will be a fast decline in Europe’s workforce, endangering its wealth. If no immigration occurs between 2010 and 2050, the EU27 will lose 84 million working-age persons, a relative change of –27 percent (compared with an absolute gain of +1,349 million working age individuals, or +34 percent, at the world level).

The third facet will be an unprecedented rise in the elderly population, jeopardizing Europe’s social contract. Booming numbers entitled to pensions combined with shrinking numbers subject to taxation will soon make the whole welfare state unsustainable. With no further immigration, the EU27 old-age dependency ratio (population aged sixty-five and over divided by population aged fifteen to sixty-four) will jump from 0.256 in 2010 to 0.468 in 2050.

Europe has recourse to a range of strategies to address the consequences of these population trends. Pursuing enlargement by including new countries in the European Union would increase the weight of the EU in world population but hardly mitigate distortions in its age pyramid, even if new member states have younger populations (for example, Turkey). Adopting pronatalist policies, raising the retirement age, increasing economic participation among women and immigrants of former migration waves, and elevating labor productivity would partly address the consequences of an aging population. Finally, redesigning pro-immigration policies—instead of suspending them in response to rising unemployment with the economic crisis, as most EU states are doing at the time of this writing—is a strategy that states must not dismiss, keeping in mind that the economic crisis will pass, but the demographic recession is here to stay.

Not far to the south, the Arab world presents a demographic pattern that contrasts strikingly with that of Europe (see figure 1-1). Until the 1980s Arab populations were viewed as the epitome of the demographic explosion. The “population problem” was felt as early as the 1930s in Egypt, when intellectuals and scientists pointed at overpopulation and rapid population growth as a major cause of underdevelopment, and a fatwa allowing contraception was pronounced by Egypt’s grand mufti in 1937, decades before the issue became a matter of debate for the Vatican.

From that time until the 1980s, the population problem centered on high birth rates, which caused the population to grow faster than the economy. A demographic measure—birth control—was seen as the solution, and family planning programs were initiated in the early 1960s in Egypt and Tunisia, then in the following decades across all the Arab world except the Gulf states.
where governments considered national populations too small in relation to the size of their oil-driven economies). Finally, the annual number of births began to grow more slowly and stabilized between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s (dates varying slightly from country to country), the years during which the largest generations were born.

Twenty to thirty years later, in the early 2010s, these generations now constitute the twenty- to thirty-five-year-old age group, which stands at its historical peak, and the population problems associated with this cohort can no longer be addressed through demographic measures. Because the numbers of young adults have grown faster than resources available to them—from labor access to employment and income to enjoyment of freedom, and more particularly the freedom to act—the solution now must be both economic and political. Before examining the various options available to the young in the Arab world, it is useful to reflect on two key determinants of demographic change: the condition of women and the spread of education.

Figure 1-1. Population of Young Adults in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) versus the European Union

![Graph showing population growth of young adults in MENA vs. European Union from 1960 to 2040](http://www.un.org/esa/population/color/imAGES.htm)


a. Young adults defined as those aged twenty to thirty-five. The Mediterranean EU states are Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain.
Women, Fertility, and Patriarchal Traditions

The average total fertility rate (TFR) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was 3.3 children per woman in 2005–10. Although this is relatively high compared to the world average (2.5), it is low compared to the six to eight children per women that were the norm for the previous generation (figure 1-2). The global decline in birth rates began later in the Arab world than in Southeast Asia or Latin America, but once under way it progressed faster. There are still significant differences among MENA countries. Tunisia and Lebanon are now just at replacement level (between 2.0 and 2.1 children per woman), Morocco and Libya are slightly above (2.4 and 2.7, respectively), and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria fall in the middle range (3.0 to 3.5). The TFR is still high in the Gulf states and

Figure 1-2. Total Fertility Rate in the MENA, 1960–2010

Average number of children per woman over her lifetime

Sudan (around 4) and in the Palestinian Territory (5.1), where the factors that would promote fertility decline have largely been countered by the economic and social ramifications of the Israeli occupation and the associated conflict.  

Fertility also varies across regions in the same country. As a general rule, cities and the richer regions have lower levels of fertility than villages and poorer regions. For example, in Morocco in 2004, urban women had a TFR of 2.1 (replacement level) compared with 3.1 for rural women. In Tunisia in 2009, the district of Tunis had a TFR of 1.65 (with a minimum of 1.50 in Ariana)—a level comparable with the very low fertility observed in Mediterranean Europe—while the district of Centre-Ouest (Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid) had a TFR of 2.46. In the Arab world, as elsewhere, factors that explain birth control include the roles of women and the place of children in the family and society, all of which change dramatically with urbanization, the shift to service economies, and the spread of school education.

Why have these universal causes for lower birth rates acted later in the Arab countries than in other parts of the world? The common view among Western social scientists is that Islam held back two key engines of demographic transition: women’s autonomy and the emergence of civil society that fosters community self-empowerment. If so, then how can one explain that Iran has experienced one of the fastest fertility declines in history—with a TFR literally collapsing from 6.54 in 1980–85 to a far-below-replacement level of 1.77 in 2005–10—precisely when the country was ruled by the most fundamentalist of clergies? Likewise, how can one understand the fertility collapse in Algeria in the 1990s that coincided with the rise of Islamic radicalism?

Another explanation may be found in the political economy of the Arab countries. All these countries (except Morocco) share a heavy dependency on oil revenues. Dependence is direct in the case of major oil exporters (the Gulf states and Iraq in Western Asia, Libya and Algeria in North Africa) and mostly indirect for minor exporters and for nonexporters where Arab oil wealth arrives in the form of development assistance, foreign investment, and migrant workers’ remittances.

The dramatic oil boom between 1973 and the early 1980s generated an income that enabled Arab governments to subsidize a wide range of household needs from food to school education and health, thereby cutting the cost of children for families—in other words, it made high fertility affordable. In an enduring patriarchal context valuing large families, the wealth from the oil boom extended the era of high levels of fertility. The redistribution of significant oil wealth effectively pitted the forces of conservatism and change
against one another. A low level of economic participation among married women, whose maintenance in the home directly fostered high fertility, reflected social conservatism. Social change, meanwhile, was seen in the rising school attendance among the young, who later would act as catalysts for political change.

The oil crisis in the mid-1980s put an end to the oil-supported pattern of high fertility rates. Collapsing oil prices affected states’ and households’ revenues in all Arab countries, oil exporters as well as nonexporters indirectly depending upon oil revenues, and governments, except in the Gulf states, adopted International Monetary Fund economic reforms under which families lost out. Average age at marriage among Arab women rose—from under twenty years of age in the 1960s to between twenty-five and thirty years in the early 2000s—and couples started to drastically limit the number of children they had in order to be able to provide them with educational opportunities. The universal mechanism described by Gary Becker as a child quantity-quality trade-off was no longer deactivated by oil wealth.9

Will fertility continue to decline and reach replacement level in Arab countries (by around 2030 as is assumed in the population projection of the United Nations)? While there seems to be no question that demographic transition is an irreversible process here as elsewhere, it responds to changes that are themselves unidirectional, making its actual pace uncertain. Indeed, the declining trend in fertility was curbed or even slightly reversed in several Arab countries in the early 2000s. In Algeria the TFR has regularly increased from a historical minimum of 2.4 reached in 2001 to 2.5 in 2002, 2.6 in 2005, 2.8 in 2008, and 2.9 in 2010.10 In Egypt it has never fallen below 3.5 children per woman, and its level in 2009 (3.9) was already reached in 1992 (table 1-1); in Tunisia, the Arab forerunner in demographic matters, it has imperceptibly risen from 2.04 in 2005 to 2.05 in 2009.11 This list could be extended. One cannot rule out that the resilience of patriarchal views that a woman’s role should be confined to being wife and mother is currently at play in the Arab region, whether or not it is fueled by Islamic fundamentalism.

Women have gained considerable visibility and an accompanying capacity to act for themselves over the last half century, but their empowerment is not complete. While schooling has allowed girls, previously confined to the family house, into the public space (see the following section), many workplaces are de facto closed off to women. In the 2000s, Arab countries had by far the world’s lowest rates of female economic participation. In the mid-2000s (last available statistics), the rate of economic activity among women aged fifteen

Copyright 2012, The Brookings Institution
Table 1-1. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Egypt, 1990–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TFR</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TFR</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TFR</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>TFR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3.73</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and over was 24.7 percent in Morocco (2004), 24.2 percent in Tunisia (2004), 16 percent in Egypt (2006), 14.6 percent in Syria (2004), 15.7 percent in Palestine (2007), and 14.2 percent in Algeria (2008), compared with a world average of 55 percent. While female employment exists in Arab countries, as elsewhere it is mostly held by never married, divorced, and widowed women, not by married women—a fact suggesting that society may allow women to work in the public space, but husbands do not.

Demographic change, however, is slowly undermining the patriarchal system that has governed the family since time immemorial. That system rests on two pillars: younger brothers’ subordination to the eldest brother, and women’s subordination to men. Fertility decline breaks the first pillar. Schematically, the current trend towards two-child families—on average, a boy and a girl—undermines a hierarchy among brothers, for lack of brothers. The second pillar can still be based on Islamic law, but the gap between law and practice is widening. Rising educational levels are shaking the hierarchy of genders. Young adult women have now received an education comparable to education for men of their age (which makes them much better educated than their fathers), and a new competition, between the genders, is appearing in the upper reaches of the labor market.

**Expansion of Education and Its Effect on Inequality**

Almost all of today’s children in the MENA spend at least a short period of time at school. In their grandparents’ (or, in a number of countries, their parents’) generation, the same majority had never been to school and remained illiterate all their lives. Like mosques, schools have become familiar buildings
in urban and rural neighborhoods, and the majority of the population is too young to recall that school education is a recent social achievement. School has introduced a modern kind of hierarchy based on educational level, one that differentiates between the most elementary groupings in society, those of gender and age.

Arab countries share three characteristics with most other developing countries with regard to education. First, despite the fact that school education is so well established that it is taken for granted as one of the fundamental rights of the individual, it only recently has become accessible to the greater public. Only a few decades have elapsed—at most a century—since the time when school did not feature in the lives of ordinary people. The second characteristic of school education is that it only provides for children and young people. Third, the level of childhood and adolescent education remains one of the few stable characteristics of an individual, in the same way as eye color or date of birth (a fact that adult literacy programs are too limited to alter).

From these three characteristics, it follows that a generation can be characterized by its level of education, from the time when that generation passes school age (twenty years) until its death. In times of change, when different generations coexisting at a given time have not had the same access to education in their youth, education introduces vertical differentiation in the population, between the generations and invariably to the advantage of the youngest ones.

Arab societies have a continuous scholarly tradition dating back to the establishment of Islam, when elementary schools (kuttâb) and higher-level establishments (madrasa) were instituted to teach the Koran and religious disciplines. However, public education, as a prerogative of the state, was not established until the twentieth century. Whatever the level of schooling being considered, from simply learning to read to graduating from the university with a diploma, education has not ceased to make up ground since then. This has resulted in a remarkable and continual rise in the average educational level of the population. In Egypt the average number of years of education goes from less than one year for the generations born before 1900 (0.9 years for boys and 0.1 for girls) to 8.4 and 7.2 years, respectively, for men and women in the generations born around 1980.

Initially, the pupils were mainly boys, but the great majority of boys, as well as girls, never became pupils at all: almost all children were excluded. Therefore schools did not introduce inequality to the mass population, but only to
the privileged minorities who, in the early days of schools, only sent boys to them. Gender inequality in modern education was thus confined to the top of the social ladder. As schooling spread, it became commonplace for boys from diverse social classes before it expanded to take in girls as well. As a result, the institution of the modern school reinforced the traditional hierarchy between the sexes by following the traditional, male-dominant patriarchal model. In Egypt the generations with the highest gender inequalities in education were born in the 1950s (figure 1-3). In more recent times, a new gender equality emerged when access to school at all levels became the norm among girls as well as boys in Egypt—as was also the case, indeed, in most Arab countries.

This movement from an old equilibrium dominated by illiteracy to a new one dominated by (some) education inspires three remarks. First, the most elementary inequality between the sexes, regarding reading and writing, has declined across the social hierarchy, starting among the privileged classes and ending with the underprivileged groups (the only groups where some residual
illiteracy among the young remains). Second, although women have gained access to education, men have had access longer, so gender equality in education has yet to be fully achieved. Third, educational inequality between the sexes peaked in the generations born in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, and it is the men from these generations who occupy positions of power in society and politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century. These generations are the heirs of the patriarchal tradition, which paradoxically was reinforced by the hierarchies arising from the earlier gender inequalities in modern public education.

The continuing spread of education had another effect: it inverted the hierarchy between age groups. While the patriarchal model placed elders at the top, schooling has given preeminence to the young, who are better educated than their elders. The decrease in illiteracy exemplifies this reversal of the traditional order. Until the generations born around 1920, children were more or less on a par with their parents in terms of education: for the most part, none of them would have received any, and illiteracy was their common destiny. As the widespread diffusion of schools benefited only children, it created a distance between them and their parents, a generation gap that is constantly widening. In Egypt the biggest gap exists between parents from the generation born around 1945 and their children from the generation born around 1980. From this perspective, the young adults of today have reached a critical point where their knowledge exceeds their elders’ to a greater extent than ever before. These elders, however, still hold the key positions of authority in the family and, indeed, in society.

Growing access to education has been accompanied by a profound change in the aspirations of individuals. However, the ever-expanding educational factory soon ceased to be matched by concomitant growth in the employment market. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the young of the MENA have been confronted with the phenomenon, unknown before 1975, of unemployment among college and university graduates. The Egyptian case described here applies across all Arab countries.

The vast majority of those unemployed in Egypt are under thirty years of age and have never been employed before. Out of every ten young adults, four start their active life with a period of unemployment lasting on average 2.5 years. The numbers of unemployed women and men are equal, a fact that makes women’s unemployment rate (number of unemployed per number of economically active) much higher than that of men (25 percent versus 9 percent, respectively, in 2008) simply because there are fewer women than men in the active population.¹³
A major change occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, namely, a steady rise in the education level of the unemployed. In the 1960s the unemployed were below average in terms of education, with almost 90 percent being illiterate or having only partially completed their primary schooling. A generation later, the situation was reversed: 2008–09 unemployment rates were 14.7 percent among young people with a secondary education and 25.6 percent among those with university or higher education. The irruption of unemployment among university graduates challenged the myth that had once elevated the value of schooling to the point where it was seen as a guaranteed route to individual well-being and social progress.

The expansion of education in the countries of the MENA has generated powerful consequences. By giving the young an advantage over their elders and gradually erasing gender inequality, educational institutions establish a new order that openly contradicts the old order that still rules day-to-day relationships, both public and private, and gives precedence to older people and to men. School, which previously opened the doors of the civil service to the sons of a peasant or a local shopkeeper, has seen its value eroded in a labor market that is dominated by the wasta, the influential person who will intervene on your behalf and without whom your diploma is worthless. This situation sets the stage for widespread frustration among the young, which in turn may lead to resignation, rebellion, or emigration.

The Birth of the Individual

Declining birth rates are expected to relieve pressures on labor markets, but not for another twenty to twenty-five years. In the meantime, the number of new job seekers (age group twenty to twenty-five) continues to grow and will reach its maximum sometime between 2005 and 2030, depending on when fertility starts to decline. The growing number of youth seeking employment is only one aspect of the changes that Arab labor markets will experience during the next two decades. Indeed, the other trends associated with declining birth rates—fundamental change in women’s roles and the dramatic spread of school education—will sharpen the competition for employment. The quantity of human capital entering the labor market is soaring.

Is this massive, demographically driven flow into the Arab labor markets an opportunity or a burden? One rather optimistic view considers demographic change a “gift” for it opens a window of opportunity to endogenous economic development. As a consequence of recent, but sharp, declines in
the birth rates, the dependency ratio is minimal.\textsuperscript{16} This is an opportunity that must be seized because declining birth rates will soon lead to an aging population, and the child dependency of the recent past will give way to the dependency of the elderly.

The current decade is a unique period, then, during which the proportion of potentially active to inactive individuals is exceptionally high (figure 1-4). For young people now beginning their working life, the future benefits of their work are no longer mortgaged to support numerous children (as was the case until recently) or the burden of the aged (as will soon be the case). This is a situation that favors savings and investment. Investment can now be economic rather than demographic: it may serve to improve the quality of life for future generations rather than meet the immediate demands of an exploding population.

The problem with this interpretation, however, is that for young people to be able to save, they need to work and to earn a sufficient income. In reality, young Arab adults are confronted with high unemployment, underemployment, low wages, and poor returns on education. On average, it takes a young

---

Figure 1-4. \textit{The Youth Bulge in North Africa, 1950–2050}

Age group 20–35 as percent of total population

![Graph showing the Youth Bulge in North Africa, 1950–2050](source)

educated person two to three years to find a first job, then again two to three years to accumulate enough savings to get married. Transition to adulthood occurs at the price of a long period of expectation and exclusion.\textsuperscript{17} In Algeria, a country where oil wealth could never translate into job opportunities for everyone, unemployment is the lot of 31 percent of young adults aged twenty to twenty-four and 26 percent of those aged twenty-five to twenty-nine.\textsuperscript{18} In Morocco unemployment is highest among the young (in urban areas, 33 percent among those aged fifteen to twenty-four and 26 percent for those aged twenty-five to thirty-four) and the highly skilled (24 percent of people with a university diploma are unemployed versus 9 percent of those with no diploma). Between 1999 and 2004, unemployment declined for every category except those with a university degree, and the higher the degree, the higher the probability of being unemployed. Unemployment starts as soon as education ends, and the higher the education received, the longer the duration of subsequent unemployment; two out of three first job seekers with a university diploma are unemployed for more than one and up to three years.\textsuperscript{19} Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria have patterns similar to those of Morocco.

Another perspective on the demographic transition focuses on the implication of low birth rates at the family and individual levels; familial constraints of earlier times will ease for new generations. Due to their own (expected) low fertility, they no longer bear the burden of numerous children. Due to their mothers’ high fertility, they still have numerous siblings to share the burden of looking after the elderly. As a result, young adults today bear a lighter family burden. From a demographic point of view, the Arab world is now witnessing the birth of the individual. For the first time, there is personal freedom of movement. The transition sets the backdrop against which the young and often educated adults now arrive on Arab labor markets, for they are increasingly free from family charges. The resulting freedom of movement also enables younger individuals to assume a greater level of risk.

More human capital flooding into the labor market not only means more capabilities but also higher expectations. Human capital has a potential for progress but also for protest. If expectations are frustrated, then the response can be anything from voicing dissatisfaction to exiting. The former is dealt with elsewhere in this volume. Two decades before the revolution of 2011, a statistical analysis of political violence in Egypt in the early 1990s showed striking correlations between the rise of education, the rate of decline in births, urban growth, and the increase in violent political action.\textsuperscript{20} But exit
(emigration) has been the most salient response to frustrated expectations over the last decades.

Exiting Instead of Voicing

Emigration from the Maghreb to Western Europe—initially to France—had actually started long before the demographic mechanisms described above, in the interwar years. It gained momentum after World War II in response to the large-scale labor needs of postwar reconstruction and accelerated when Tunisia (1956), Morocco (1956), and Algeria (1962) became independent nations, confronted as they were with huge unemployment problems at home. Migration was then driven by economic forces—the search for a labor force in Europe meeting the search for employment in the Maghreb—and managed by guest worker programs defined under bilateral agreements between sending and receiving states. Migrants were all men moving back and forth between their homes in the Maghreb and their workplace in Europe, according to labor agendas.

This situation dramatically changed with the severe economic crisis, triggered by soaring oil prices, that hit the industrial economies in Western Europe starting in 1973 and that soon resulted in mounting unemployment in Europe. One after another, all the concerned governments responded by closing the borders to foreign workers in an attempt to end migration. However, this measure produced just the opposite outcome: migrants who were in Europe at that time did not return to their home countries for fear of not being allowed to reenter Europe, and since they stayed, their wives and children could join them, thanks to European laws supporting family reunification. In a few years, it became obvious that visa restrictions had transformed the two-way mobility of temporary male migrant workers into one-way permanent immigration of mostly inactive family dependents of former migrants. Immigration was no longer driven by the economic logic of labor markets but by the sociological stimulus of families and networks. Legislation on naturalization and *jus soli* consequently made populations originating in the Maghreb and their descendants a genuine part of national populations in Europe.

Two observations must be made here. First, European labor markets always remained more open than their respective governments were to migrant workers, for migrants accept jobs that are no longer attractive to natives and more generally allow a flexible adaptation of labor supply to demand. If there is no legal way to enter or reside in the country, then unauthorized entry or
unauthorized stay offers a second best solution. And irregular migration grew in the late 1980s in response to visa restrictions as well as to employers’ strategies of hiring underpaid, informal workers. Second, soon after Western Europe experienced the 1973 crisis, Southern Europe emerged as a new magnet for migrant workers. Starting again in the late 1980s, the steady growth of the Italian economy and, even more strikingly, the boom of the Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese economies with the fall of their dictators and their subsequent admission into the European Union transformed these countries with a long tradition of emigration into new destinations for southern and eastern Mediterranean migrants. From there, due to the implementation of the Schengen Treaty in 1990, they could reach the whole European space of free circulation. The term Fortress Europe may work to describe policies limiting labor migration, but it never reflected the reality on the ground as European borders were never sealed up.

Farther away from Western Europe, emigration from Egypt and the Mashreq (Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria) followed a different route. In the Arab east, where the Ottoman Empire had once established a vast area of free circulation, the movement of people has remained the most significant form of regional exchange. Contrasting with the peaceful relocations of the past, however, modern migration has constantly been linked to wars and conflicts in the Mashreq. The wars of Palestine (1948–49 and 1967) as well as the low-intensity conflicts continuing since then have been instrumental in fostering emigration: directly, locally, they caused two Palestinian exoduses and a constant flow of emigration from the Palestinian occupied territory; indirectly, beyond Palestine, the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict bolstered military regimes claiming their solidarity with the Palestinians (and belligerence toward Israel), whose authoritarian rule also became a strong driver of Arab migration.

During the October 1973 war, with a battlefront along the Suez Canal, the supply of oil became a new weapon, and the price of crude oil quadrupled, creating vast wealth in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf. The commensurate need for labor from outside was decisive in orienting migrant flows from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon toward Arab oil states, which still remain the most popular destinations for migrants from these countries.

However, the 1990–91 Gulf War was an unprecedented trauma in that region. Virtually overnight some 3 million migrant workers were cast out simply because they were the wrong nationality: Egyptian peasants in Iraq, unskilled Yemeni construction workers in Saudi Arabia, and Palestinian white-collar workers in Kuwait.
In the 2000s, the largest wave of Arab refugees since 1948 was triggered by the sectarian violence in Iraq that erupted all over the country after its invasion and occupation by the United States, Great Britain, and several other countries. An estimated 2 million Iraqis fled their homeland from October 2005 through 2007. The previous waves that had fled Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the 1990s could find refuge in a number of countries, including several EU member states, but those fleeing Iraq under American occupation found shelter almost exclusively in nearby Arab countries. They arrived first in Jordan, at least until 2005, then in Syria and Lebanon, and finally in Egypt, four countries located in the Euro-Mediterranean area and linked to the EU by association agreements. Not only were Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon the main countries hosting Palestinian refugees, but now they also became the largest recipients of Iraqi refugees, with only tiny numbers of these refugees subsequently being allowed into nearby Europe. (A later section shows how history repeated itself in 2011, this time with refugees fleeing Libya.)

By around 2010 Arab Mediterranean countries were the source of a recorded 10.8 million emigrants (table 1-2)—12 million or more if unrecorded migrants are included.21 Migrants represent 5.3 percent (or more likely 6 percent) of the population of their origin countries, which is twice the 3 percent world average and demonstrates the very high propensity for migration among young Arabs. Moreover, emigration was steadily rising until the 2008 economic crisis hit the principal destinations in Europe and the Gulf, and the 2011 war in Libya, which triggered a return migration from Libya to Egypt and Tunisia.

Figure 1-5 shows the considerable increase in the number of Moroccan migrants in the 1990s and 2000s. Their total population rose from 1.545 million in 1993 to 3.293 million in 2007, an average rate of 5.4 percent over that time period, which is more than four times higher than the rate of growth of the total population in Morocco (1.2 percent during the same period). It is worth stressing, first, that emigration from Morocco kept growing steadily precisely at a moment when demographic growth started to decline and when the youth bulge started, a bulge that correlates with migration; and second, that Moroccan migrants kept going to France, Italy, and particularly to Spain after the crisis, despite soaring unemployment there.

Surveys of the young in the Middle East reveal that the proportion of that population who wish or intend to emigrate ranges from a quarter to an enormously high three-quarters of that age group, depending on which country is under analysis. In the second half of the 1990s, a Eurostat-coordinated survey already found high proportions: 14 percent in Egypt, 27 percent in Turkey, and
20 percent in Morocco. More recent surveys suggest even higher numbers. Tunisia, a country with a successful economy but a stalled democratization process, is a case in point (table 1-3): in 2005, 76 percent of fifteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds declared that they were contemplating emigration, compared to 45 percent in 2000 and 22 percent in 1996. Many of them, of course, may simply dream without making concrete plans, but their dreams relay much about the discomfort that characterizes the young of MENA countries.

Potential future migration from Arab Mediterranean countries depends not only on the proportion of their youth bulge, which is known, but also on a number of unknown economic and political factors. Whether and in what proportion migrants will choose Europe as their destination is also a matter of conjecture. What is less debatable, however, is that due to demographic change, future patterns of migration will not resemble those of the past and not even those of the present day. Family profiles of young Arab migrants are changing radically. Yesterday, they had a family left at home, and their emigration was motivated by the need to feed and educate their families. Remitting money to those at home was the main reason for leaving the country, and

Table 1-2. Migrants from Arab Mediterranean Countries, by Region of Residence, 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of residence</th>
<th>European Union</th>
<th>Gulf States</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Other Arab countries</th>
<th>Other countries</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td>Algeria 1,475,662</td>
<td>19,595</td>
<td>4,593</td>
<td>21,850</td>
<td>56,310</td>
<td>1,578,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt 199,153</td>
<td>1,132,091</td>
<td>164,348</td>
<td>121,082</td>
<td>226,661</td>
<td>1,843,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya 43,646</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>6,928</td>
<td>10,947</td>
<td>63,556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco 2,390,174</td>
<td>46,544</td>
<td>19,839</td>
<td>26,279</td>
<td>92,522</td>
<td>2,575,358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia 516,440</td>
<td>15,985</td>
<td>14,124</td>
<td>11,311</td>
<td>20,308</td>
<td>578,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauritania 26,518</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>3,174</td>
<td>2,648</td>
<td>33,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan 25,745</td>
<td>168,668</td>
<td>2,053</td>
<td>48,990</td>
<td>78,195</td>
<td>323,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon 153,196</td>
<td>52,543</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>6,635</td>
<td>296,065</td>
<td>509,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine 8,401</td>
<td>136,573</td>
<td>28,596</td>
<td>2,699,280</td>
<td>34,530</td>
<td>2,907,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria 109,913</td>
<td>120,524</td>
<td>17,017</td>
<td>91,477</td>
<td>82,482</td>
<td>421,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,948,848</td>
<td>1,695,570</td>
<td>251,536</td>
<td>3,037,006</td>
<td>900,668</td>
<td>10,833,628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unpublished table obtained from national population census data of the countries of residence, compiled by A. di Bartolomeo for the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, European University Institute.

a. Migrants are defined as “foreign-born residents” (best option) or “foreign nationals” according to countries of residence.

Copyright 2012, The Brookings Institution
in many cases return was part of the migration plan. Tomorrow’s young emigrants will typically have no children or wives, and their goal will rather be self-accomplishment.

The “South” of the South

Arab Mediterranean countries are not only sources but also recipients of international migration. In 2010 they had some 4.5 million immigrants (table 1-4). A majority are migrant, mostly low-skilled workers coming from less developed countries further to the south or east, migrants who take jobs that have become unattractive for natives. Refugees form a second category, whose numbers soared in the 2000s with conflicts in, for example, Iraq and Darfur as well as in several sub-Saharan countries. Most then find themselves stranded in countries of first asylum where they cannot obtain residency or even a proper refugee status, and there they either wait for resettlement in a third country or for return to their country of origin when the conditions allow. A third category of

Figure 1-5. Moroccan Migrant Populations in France, Italy, and Spain, 1992–2010

Sources: France, consular records; Spain, municipal registers, Instituto Nacional de Estadística; Italy, residence permits, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica.
Table 1-3. *Desire to Emigrate among Tunisian Youth, 1996–2005*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25–29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


migrants, by far the smallest group, are transit migrants stuck on their way to Europe, which they cannot enter for lack of a visa.

A salient characteristic of the early 2000s is the dramatic rise in irregular migration from south of the Mediterranean. While much attention is given to those who clandestinely attempt or succeed in crossing the Mediterranean to Europe, very little is said about the bulk of this migration, which is actually destined for or stranded in the countries of the southern Mediterranean. Some of these migrants had entered the MENA country where they now live irregularly, but many others had their passport regularly stamped at the border and assumed irregular status only after their permit to stay expired or was invalidated due to changes in laws regarding the conditions of work and residence for foreign nationals. For example, in Egypt the legal status of the Sudanese, who form the largest migrant population, has varied over time, from full freedom of movement and residence (1956–95) to visa requirement...
Table 1-4. Regular and Irregular Immigrants in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, circa 2005
Number of persons, except as indicated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Regular immigrants</th>
<th>Irregular immigrants</th>
<th>Ratio irregular/regular (minimum)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>De facto refugees</td>
<td>Transit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>80,238</td>
<td>Tens of thousands</td>
<td>95,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>115,589</td>
<td>Tens of thousands</td>
<td>104,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to hundreds of thousands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>392,273</td>
<td>100,000 or more</td>
<td>519,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>302,315</td>
<td>400–500,000</td>
<td>22,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>449,065</td>
<td>1.0–1.2 million</td>
<td>4,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>Few thousands</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>62,348</td>
<td>Thousands to tens of thousands</td>
<td>1,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>Thousands to tens of thousands</td>
<td>707,422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>35,192</td>
<td>Thousands to tens of thousands</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,540,020</td>
<td>2–3 million</td>
<td>1,456,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


n.a. = Not available.
(1995–2004) to again, at least theoretically, freedom of residence by virtue of a bilateral agreement signed in 2004 but never fully implemented. In Syria, a country open to nationals of all other Arab countries in the name of pan-Arabism, a visa obligation was suddenly imposed on Iraqis in 2007, transforming hundreds of thousands of refugees who had originally been admitted as “guests” into irregular migrants.

Libya before the fall of Qaddafi was a case in point. Persistently subordinating migration policy to changing foreign policy interests, its government successively opened the country’s borders to Arabs in the name of pan-Arabism, then to Africans in the name of pan-Africanism, before imposing visas on both Arabs and Africans to please Europe at a time when Libya had become a major gateway for irregular migrants from Africa. Potentially all those who had entered Libya without a visa were made irregular by measures taken in 2007. Irregular migrants have recurrently been scapegoated by being presented as a threat to public security, and as such they were subject to mass deportations in 1995, 2003–05, and 2008.

Revolt and Its Impact on Migration

At the beginning of 2011, revolt flared across the entire Arab region in response to the long-standing frustrations of the population. Uprisings spread in predominantly migrant-sending countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen) as well as in predominantly migrant-receiving countries (Libya, Bahrain). While the Arab Spring already has had a massive impact on immigrants in war-torn Libya, it will probably produce far-reaching consequences for migratory movements both originating in and destined for the region.

In Libya the exodus caused by the war strikingly resembles what happened in another oil-rich, labor-importing part of the Arab region twenty years earlier, when the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, provoking the then unprecedented exodus of 3 million migrant workers. Between February and October 2011, more than 1 million people crossed the border out of Libya (table 1-5), 37 percent of them Libyans seeking refuge and the rest mostly temporary migrant workers returning to their homes. But in and among these two groups, there were also an unknown number of de facto refugees from other regions who were trying to find another shelter. Many of these were nationals of conflict-torn Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad, and a few other African countries, who needed protection but could not claim refugee status in Libya since the country does not recognize refugees.
Many Libyan nationals may have returned to their homes at the time of this writing. On the other hand, among those who were migrant workers in Libya, the vast majority (96.1 percent) have reached an African destination, either their own or a third country (see table 1-5). Only 3.9 percent of them, including all the European expatriates in Libya, went to Europe when the country erupted in riots (table 1-6). Not all migrants and de facto refugees were able to flee the conflict in Libya. Many were stuck there, where they often suffered widespread abuse and human rights violations from both ousted regime loy-

**Table 1-5. Persons Fleeing Libya, by Nationality, 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libyans seeking refuge abroad(a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisians returning to Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptians returning to Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-country nationals reaching Tunisia or Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other migrants reaching an African country bordering Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants and refugees of all nationalities fleeing from Libya to Italy or Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total migrants and Libyans(c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


- a. Arrivals of Libyans in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria as of June 8, 2011.
- c. As of September 30, 2011, for migrants and June 8, 2011, for Libyans.

Many Libyan nationals may have returned to their homes at the time of this writing. On the other hand, among those who were migrant workers in Libya, the vast majority (96.1 percent) have reached an African destination, either their own or a third country (see table 1-5). Only 3.9 percent of them, including all the European expatriates in Libya, went to Europe when the country erupted in riots (table 1-6). Not all migrants and de facto refugees were able to flee the conflict in Libya. Many were stuck there, where they often suffered widespread abuse and human rights violations from both ousted regime loy-

**Table 1-6. Migrants Fleeing Libya, by Country of Arrival**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units as indicated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See table 1-5.
alists and forces of the National Transitional Council, who accused them of being mercenaries of Colonel Qaddafi.24

Contrary to fears expressed by some European governments, waves of migrants and refugees fleeing Libya did not flood into the European Union. As of September 30, 2011, 27,465 had arrived in Italy and Malta compared to 678,608 migrants (Libyan nationals excluded) who reached an African destination. The road to Europe was not only the less traveled, it also was by far the most dangerous. According to the Italian blog “Fortress Europe,” 1,931 migrants died in the Mediterranean between January and July 2011, most in the Channel of Sicily (1,674).25 When the number of migrants dying at sea is compared to the number who arrived safely in Italy and Malta, one finds the probability of dying while traveling from Libya to Europe to be a shockingly high 6.5 percent, certainly many times higher than the probability of dying while traveling across the desert to an African destination.

The EU took measures to contain flows toward its shores and also to alleviate the burden on Tunisia and Egypt, the two countries that actually took in the largest refugee waves at a time when they themselves were destabilized by revolutions. It must be noted, however, that the EU took no action to accommodate the refugees in Europe. The Libyan crisis suggests that European states need to critically reassess their asylum policies, not the least since their migration policies had led some of them to support, and thereby strengthen, the Qaddafi regime in order to contain irregular migration across the Mediterranean.

In Egypt and Tunisia popular revolts will certainly have repercussions for migration. What is unknown though is how, and this will depend, of course, on their political and economic outcomes. If the revolts succeed in establishing regimes that respond to the peoples’ demands for freedom and dignity, and if they generate economic prosperity and social equity, the deep causes of emigration will fade, outflows of migrants will slacken, and return migration from the diaspora might even begin. However, if the revolts fail to achieve democracy, and if economies flounder, the opposite outcome is more likely, and emigration will soar and return migration will fall.

In Egypt the trends since January 2011 have generated mixed signals. On the one hand, political unrest has already cost its economy an estimated $9.8 billion, and tourism, a sector from which more than 10 percent of Egyptian households directly or indirectly earn their living, has at least temporarily disappeared.26 In a survey of young Egyptians performed by the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) in the summer of 2011, 15–20 percent declared an intention to emigrate in the near future, a proportion strikingly close to those found in two previous surveys: one conducted in 2009 by the Population Council among 15,000 Egyptians aged ten to twenty-nine (18 percent intended to migrate) and the other carried out in 1998 by the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics in the framework of a Eurostat survey (14 percent intended to migrate).27 The Summer 2011 IOM survey among young people with an intention to migrate found that almost half of them (44 percent) had already decided to migrate before the uprising, and most of the rest (41 percent) were only slightly influenced by events; but still a significant proportion (15 percent) admitted that the uprising had made them want to migrate.28

On the other hand, the response from Egyptian expatriates has run contrary to expectations. It was believed that Egyptians abroad would wait before sending any more money home while they observed from a distance the economic evolution in their home country. Thus remittances for fiscal year 2010–11 were expected to fall below the ones for the previous year ($9.5 billion). Instead, remittances reached a historical high of $12.6 billion.29 Was this the result of a campaign to incite migrants to remit through official channels, or a burst of trust in the Egyptian economy and an upsurge of patriotism among Egyptian expatriates? Or, instead, did soaring remittances simply reflect an unusually intense movement of Egyptian migrants returning from the Gulf?30 At this writing, it is still too soon to assess what actually took place. Finally, it must be noted that the topic of irregular emigration, which was regularly making the headlines in the Egyptian press before the revolution, simply disappeared from the mainstream media in January 2011 as other matters closer to home took precedence.

A different situation unfolded in Tunisia, where the onset of popular uprisings was followed by a surge in irregular emigration to Italy: in the first quarter of 2011, some 20,000 Tunisian nationals were recorded as irregularly landing on the Italian island of Lampedusa. However, irregular migration rapidly lost momentum when many migrants were repatriated to Tunisia when the terms of the readmission agreement, passed in 2009 between their country and Italy, were applied; indeed, the number of Tunisian irregular migrants arriving in the second quarter of 2011 fell to 4,300.31 The larger than usual emigration in the first months of 2011 has been explained not by a surge in the intention to migrate so much as by the opportunity provided by the fall of the dictatorship.32
Conclusion

The old, established demographic order of the Mediterranean is being overturned. For the first time since the Roman Empire, the African shore is about to overtake the European shore. Egypt, which barely had 2.5 million inhabitants at the beginning of the nineteenth century, became in 1995 the largest Mediterranean nation, more populous than either France or Italy, and is expected to exceed the population of those two countries combined in just one generation, reaching a population of 120 million somewhere between 2040 and 2050. During the same time frame, the population of Algeria will be greater than that of Italy, and Morocco’s population will exceed that of Spain. However, that migration from the south to the north will gain momentum, as these numbers might suggest at first glance, should not be taken for granted.

As of this writing, no one knows when the economic crisis will be over and full employment resume in the north, but one can assume that the European Union will sooner or later recover and remain a magnet for global migrants. Unless unprecedented demographic aging is accompanied by major resistance to accepting newcomers, a number of jobs in EU labor markets should again be open to immigrants. From where will they come? Migration is asymmetric in essence, and the receiving end—the state, the market, and to a certain extent networks of former migrants—is where the origin of new migrants is ultimately determined. With migration becoming global, geographic proximity is no longer the primary factor it once was, and states and employers are just as likely to favor immigrants from more distant regions, as happened in Spain when massive flows arrived from Latin America in the early 2000s.

In the Arab region, demographic trends are likely to remain favorable to emigration, but not for very long and not at the same level in each country. The youth bulge, which has been historically concomitant with emigration peaks in many parts of the world, is already receding in those Arab countries farthest along the demographic transition (Tunisia, Lebanon, and Morocco) but is likely to persist in others, such as Palestine, Syria, Jordan, Algeria, and also Egypt. Egypt, once the Arab pioneer of family planning and birth control under President Nasser, is now following a different path, with birth rates halfway between pre- and post-transitional levels. This corresponds with the unachieved empowerment of women, who still are largely secluded from the workplace, even though girls have now gained parity with boys at school and university.

The resilience, or return, of traditional patterns of fertility and family building in Egypt may well reflect a broader change under way in the MENA,
triggered by models and values borrowed from Saudi Arabia and spread by oil money and migrants returning from the Gulf. In Egypt, as in other Arab countries, future political developments will be instrumental in determining whether emigration will slacken or amplify and where it will go. The economic successes or failures of future regimes and, as important, their inclination to respect or disregard the dignity and freedom of their people will be key factors affecting the scale of emigration. Their options in international politics, their relations with Europe, and, perhaps more significant, their view of the West and the values they choose to promote will play a role in orienting would-be migrants toward Europe or elsewhere.

There are currently 5 million first-generation migrants from the Arab countries in the European Union, and that number increases if their sons and daughters born in Europe, the so-called second-generation migrants, are counted. Despite the fact that some of them are poorly integrated—as has always happened in the history of migration—many others fully interact with the natives of their host society, with whom they share increasingly equal opportunities. In the neighborhoods where they live, migrants often share social spaces with natives, with whom they work and trade and whom they sometimes marry. Migrants are continuously exposed to the mainstream values and practices of the society where they live, which they progressively make their own and transmit to their society of origin according to a mechanism described as “social remittances.”34 Thus migrants make an invaluable contribution to reducing cultural divides by bringing part of their culture of origin to the host society while transferring to their society of origin elements of the host society’s culture. Migration has been the most critical form of exchange across the Mediterranean over the last half century, building cultural as well as economic bridges. Whether it continue or recedes will largely depend on political choices.

Notes

1. The countries that are the focus of this chapter—from west to east, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—are both Arab and Mediterranean (except Jordan). While they are viewed as one region by the European Union (EU’s southern neighborhood, sometimes called MEDA in EU’ jargon, designating the Mediterranean countries linked with the EU by an Association agreement), they do not form an entity that would be recognized as such by the concerned peoples, who rather identify with the wider Arabic-speaking world, which also includes (Northern) Sudan, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gulf states. In order to stay
close to common perceptions among Arabs, this chapter also uses the following terminology: Arab world, which encompasses all the above countries; Northern Africa (from Morocco to Egypt); Maghreb (from Morocco to Libya); and Mashreq (from Egypt to Syria).


14. Ibid., p.82.


16. Dependency ratio = population 0 to 14 plus population 65 and over/population 15 to 64.


21. The total number in table 1–2 underestimates real migrant populations in 2010 for three reasons: estimates for the Gulf states refer to year 2000 data, but subsequently emigration to the Gulf has been intense in the early 2000s; counts of Egyptians and Tunisians in Libya—where they do not need an entry visa—are obviously underestimated; and a number of other host countries are not included.


30. Ibid.


