EMN Ad-Hoc Query on Detecting jihadists in the asylum procedure
Requested by Hans LEMMENS on 17th June 2016

Protection
Responses from Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Sweden, United Kingdom, Norway (18 in total)

Disclaimer:
The following responses have been provided primarily for the purpose of information exchange among EMN NCPs in the framework of the EMN. The contributing EMN NCPs have provided, to the best of their knowledge, information that is up-to-date, objective and reliable. Note, however, that the information provided does not necessarily represent the official policy of an EMN NCPs’ Member State.
**Background information:**

Since the influx of refugees to Europe, there have been numerous media reports referring to the risk of jihadists using the refugee flow to enter Europe. In its most recent annual risk analysis, Frontex stated that the attacks in Paris in November 2015 clearly demonstrated that irregular migratory flows could be used by terrorists to enter the EU, as two of the attackers had presented fraudulent Syrian passports to enter the EU through Greece.

Another risk that has been identified is the possibility of radicalization and recruitment for the jihad among asylum seekers in and around European reception centers. The German and Norwegian security services have recently confirmed reports of such incidents as published in the media. In the Netherlands, a man was recently convicted for recruitment activities in a reception facility.

Next to the above mentioned risks jihadists could also formally seek for asylum.

The Ministry of Security and Justice has instigated research on the question of how and to what extent relevant governmental institutions involved in the immigration process are equipped to identify 1) possible jihadists in the asylum process, and 2) recruitment activities in reception centers. The scope of this survey is to explore what policies exist in other European countries with respect to these issues. The questions below are aimed at gaining a general insight into policies and measures that have been reported to the public. They are not aimed at obtaining operational or confidential information, as your replies will be used for a public report aimed at informing Parliament and the wider public.

**Questions**

1. Have these abovementioned risks been acknowledged, considered or discussed in your country, for instance in parliament or in the context of risk assessments relating to asylum and terrorism or discussions around contra-terrorism measures, and if so, can you refer to public reports of these discussions or assessments?
2. Have any measures been taken in order to create awareness and a reporting structure for the identification of possible jihadists in or around the asylum process, and if so, can you list these?
3. Have any measures been taken in order to promote the identification of radicalization or recruitment for the jihad in reception centers, and if so, can you list these?
4. Have any measures been taken to increase awareness among employees of relevant governmental institutions involved in the asylum process or working within the reception centers with respect to the abovementioned risks, and if so, what measures?
5. Could you indicate whether reporting on the presence of possible jihadists or incidents of radicalization or recruitment for the jihad in or around the asylum process has increased since October 2014 and to what extent?

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| Austria | Yes                 | 1. The risk emanating from potential jihadists among asylum-seekers is known in Austria and is also discussed by the public. In this regard, the competent authorities regularly perform risk assessments. A publicly available article in this regard on the topic migration and refugee movements and on possible systematic smuggling of jihadists on refugee routes to Europe is contained in the Report on the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutzbericht) 2015 of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT), available on the website of the Federal Ministry of the Interior under www.bmi.gv.at. Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior.  
  
2. The reporting for the identification of potential jihadists in the connection with asylum proceedings is first conducted internally within the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum (BFA). Afterwards, relevant information is forwarded immediately to the competent local and centralized authorities (Provincial Agencies for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism) and necessary security measures are taken. Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior.  
  
3. In order to promote the identification of radicalization or recruitment for the jihad in reception centers, the security authorities maintain regular contact with local institutions in the field of asylum and reception centers. Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior.  
  
4. In order to increase the awareness for this phenomenon and to promote the identification of potential jihadists among asylum-seekers, the security authorities (Provincial Agencies for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism) conduct trainings and awareness-raising events for employees in the field of asylum (Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, First Reception Centers, etc.). Further, in this regard a regular contact is maintained between the Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum, the competent departments of the Federal Ministry of the |
**5.** Since October 2014, an increased number of referrals of suspected terrorists among migrants staying in or transiting through Austria has been received by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. This information is referred by various authorities, diplomatic and also private sources. They are taken very seriously and examined in each case. However, most of the indications and suspicions so far could be regarded as unsubstantiated or not confirmed due to the lack of specific indications after first inquiries. The reason is that suspicious persons did not even stay in Austria or the information received was contradictory or lacking further indications no evidence for the confirmation of a suspicious situation could be obtained. Source: Federal Ministry of the Interior.

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| **1.** Yes,  
The federal coalition agreement stipulates that:  
• The Belgian Government will soon formulate a policy for preventive action in the fight against radicalism;  
• The federal government will support the local authorities and the Integrated Police in their efforts to quickly detect and combat radicalization;  
• The government will work on a broad social mobilization in the fight against violent jihadism, including through engaging in an intensive dialogue with the religious leaders and the civil society.  
- The General Policy Note of the Minister of Security and Home Affairs dd. 4 November 2015 (http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/54/1428/54K1428004.pdf, pages 9-11 and 26-29, available in Dutch and French) pays particular attention to the prevention of radicalism. Some fragments are:  
" The collaboration between the federal and local level forms the spearhead of the fight against radicalization. The local task forces are strengthened and restructured. The information flow is interactive by creating a new dynamic database. Classified information will be better be exchanged by the words of a local Information Officer who has a security clearance".  
- The General Policy Note of the State Secretary on Asylum Policy and Migration dd. 3 November 2015 also mentions the achievements in the fight against radicalism and terrorism |
The circular note of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Justice concerning the exchange of information about and the monitoring of foreign terrorist fighters from Belgium, August 21, 2015 (restricted dissemination).

Framework Policy Note on Integrated Security 2016-2019
(http://justitie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/2016-06-07_kadernota_integrale_veiligheid_nl.pdf, published by the Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs, in June 2016 is a strategic and policy and reference framework for all actors which, because of their competences and responsibilities or from their social objectives, can contribute to achieving an effective approach to safety.


10 AUGUST 2015 - Law amending the Law of December 15, 1980 on access to the territory, residence, establishment and removal of aliens in order to better take into account the threats to society and national security in applications for international protection (available in Dutch and French http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=nl&la=N&table_name=wet&cn=2015081011)

Furthermore, several questions were asked at the State Secretary of Asylum Policy and Migration in the House of Representatives:
- 25/08/2015: Question about radicalized refugees
- 15/10/2015: Question about the screening of asylum applicants for IS fighters
- 01/12/2015: Question about the Task Force on radicalization in the field of asylum and migration
- 16/12/2016: Question about the presence of radicalized people in asylum centers
(http://www.dekamer.be/kvvcr/showpage.cfm?section=qrva&language=nl&cfm=qrvaXml.cfm?legislat=54
Note: In Belgium, there are only two intelligence and security services. State Security (Veiligheid van de Staat) is the civil intelligence service. The service is primarily under the authority of the Minister of Justice. Sometimes, however, it acts under the authority of the Minister of Home Affairs. The General Intelligence and Security Service of the armed forces (Algemene Dienst Inlichting en Veiligheid van de Krijgsmacht) is the military intelligence service. It is under the authority of the Minister of Defence.
The National Security Council is the political body which determines the general intelligence policy of the government. It takes political and legislative initiatives with regard to intelligence and security.

2. NATIONAL ACTION PLAN RADICALISM

In 2006 the Ministerial Committee on Intelligence and Security adopted The Action Plan on Radicalism. After the foiled attack in Verviers (Belgium) early 2015 the Federal Government decided to an update of the Action Plan on Radicalism. On 14 December 2015 the reformed Action Plan on Radicalism was approved by the National Security Council. The coordination of the plan is in hands of the National Task Force on Radicalism, under the chairmanship of the Threat Assessment Coordination Body (Coördinatieorgaan voor de dreigingsanalyse - OCAD).

The Action Plan tackles radicalism and extremism in the society, through an integrated collaboration between various government departments. The Action Plan on Radicalism aims at a common and integrated approach and therefore works on several levels (federal, federated entities, local). To achieve this, the Action Plan has two objectives: the early identification of individuals and groups with a radicalizing effect on their environment and the reduction of the impact of these vectors of radicalization.

NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON RADICALISM

At the federal level the National Task Force is the strategic and policymaking body of the Action Plan Radicalism. The Task Force meets monthly to share information and to discuss measures to be taken. The Task Force is chaired by the Threat Assessment Coordination Body (OCAD) and is composed of members of the State Security (Veiligheid van de Staat), the General Intelligence and Security Service of (Algemene Dienst Inlichtingen en Veiligheid – ADIV), representatives of the federal and local police, the Federal Public Service Foreign Affairs, the Federal Public Service Justice – directorate general Penal Institutions, the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (Cel voor Financiële Informatieverwerking – CFI), the Federal...
Public Service Home Affairs, the Immigration Office, the General Directorate Crisis Centre (Algemene Directie Crisiscentrum – ADCC), a representative of the Directorate General of Prevention and Safety of the Federal Public Service Home Affairs (Algemene Directie Veiligheid en Preventie), the Public Prosecutor’s Office and representatives of the Communities and the Regions.

The information on radicalism gathered at the different levels is stored in two databases:

- The Joint Information Box is an electronic database that contains information about radicalizing individuals and groups who need to be followed up as a matter of priority. The National Task Force decides with consensus on inclusion in or deletion from the Joint Information Box.
- The Database Foreign Terrorist Fighters is a dynamic database with individualized files per foreign terrorist fighter. All services (included on local level) have access to this information and can add new information.

WORKING GROUPS

The National Task Force on Radicalism determines which working groups are being launched. For each working group a pilot service is designated that brings together all relevant partners in order to carry out the defined tasks. The purpose of the working groups is to achieve on the one hand a constant cooperation, and on the other hand a specific know-how with respect to a specific vector of radicalization. The working groups make annual progress reports on the content of the cooperation, the progress of the work, the evaluation of the measures and proposals to reduce radicalization.

The field of action of a working group is related to certain phenomena, trends or issues:

- The permanent working groups work on the radicalization on the Internet, in prisons and on radio and television and on prevention
- The thematic working groups deal with phenomena such as Salafism, right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and trends in Asia Minor and the North Caucasus
- The workgroup Foreign Terrorist Fighters was founded by the circular note of August 21, 2015
- The ad hoc working groups Preachers, Mosques and Asylum and Migration work on the problem of radicalization in each of these domains.

The working group Radicalism of the Asylum and Migration Services:

A working group on radicalism was established within the asylum and migration authorities. This initiative fits into the framework of the National Action Plan on Radicalism (the so-called ‘Plan R’). The working group, led by the Immigration Office, consists of the Immigration Office, the Office of the Commissioner
General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, the Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Fedasil) and liaison officers of the State Security, the Military Intelligence Service (ADIV) and the Federal Police. The main objective of this working group is to strengthen the exchange of relevant information between the asylum and migration authorities and the security and intelligence services and to identify good functioning exchange channels. The administrative approach of individual records by the asylum and migration services is discussed within this group. The goal is to deal with the problem of radicalized foreigners, not only asylum seekers but also other migrants. The working group analyses the "incidents" related "to radicalism and migration". The group is also in charge for optimizing the screening of asylum seekers, training and vigilance counselling/awareness training for asylum authorities in cooperation with the intelligence and security services. The group monitors the problem of radical imams and preachers of hate. The groups aims to strengthen the exchange of relevant information between asylum and migration authorities and the security and intelligence services and the police.

To optimize the flow of information between the various services, a chain approach was elaborated and a contact point was appointed in each service.

The working group started on the 19th of November 2015.

LOCAL TASKFORCES
In order to achieve and guarantee an exchange with the local level, the Local Task Forces were set up. Local Task Forces (LTF) are policy and operational consultation platforms for, inter alia, police forces and intelligence services within a geographically defined area.

- They work on policy at district level and are operational on the local level. They follow radicalizing individuals and groups at local level and propose measures to reduce the impact of these individuals and groups;
- They exchange information, intelligence and analysis, align them and maintain structural and/ or punctual contacts with local authorities and their services;
- They can propose to include information in or delete information from the Joint Information Box (see supra);
- They provide support for non-specialized frontline staff of the police who are facing possible signs of radicalization and they can propose and steer preventive and disruptive measures;
- They do the follow-up of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

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LOCAL INTEGRATED SECURITY CELLS

In order to ensure the full implementation of the National Action Plan and to achieve the consistency and coherence between the preventive, the repressive and the follow-up actions and/or measures the Local Integrated Security Cells (LIVC) were created to act as local municipal consultation platforms. At this consultation platform the exchange of information between the social and preventive services, the local taskforce and the administrative authorities takes place.

Other bodies working on radicalism are:

CELL RADICALISM within the Immigration Office

The State Secretary for Asylum and Migration Policy has supported the proposal to create a Cell Radicalism Cell within the Immigration Office. This proposal follows the measures adopted in November 2015 by the Government. The Council of Ministers approved the proposal on 05.02.2016. The Radicalism Cell became effective on 01.05.2016.

The Unit is in particular responsible for:

• Defining communication and information exchange channels, clearly identifying these channels and assuring their efficiency both internally and with its partners (Security of State, Threat Assessment Coordination Body (OCAD), General Service Intelligence and Security (ADIV), the federal and local police, the Federal Reception Agency for Asylum Seekers (Fedasil), the Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons);
• Provide clear and accurate information on the steps to follow in case of detection of radicalism and/or terrorism;
• As an expert, being the central point of contact for issues related to radicalism in asylum and migration dossiers;
• Coordinating the information relating to persons on radicalism and terrorism and the procedures to be followed within the framework of the implementation of the Immigration Act;
• Analyzing the legislative situation at European level and identifying good practices of the asylum and migration services in the Member States, making proposals at the national level with regard to the expertise of partners of the European Union.

Accomplishing these goals should help to contribute to effectively manage the residence of people with
connections to radicalism and terrorism and to contribute to the proposed legislative changes when necessary for the proper management of such situations.

RADICALISM UNIT within the Federal Public Service Home Affairs
The General Directorate Security and Prevention (ADVP) is one of the five general directorates of the Federal Public Service Home Affairs and created the Radicalism Unit in September 2014. The Unit is responsible for the federal coordination of initiatives for prevention and control of violent radicalization. The Unit facilitates the security policy of local authorities and supports them in their efforts to combat violent radicalism.

The Unit provides:
• Policy advice: advising authorities on violent radicalization and its approach;
• Knowledge acquisition and dissemination (research & development): build scientific knowledge and expertise on radicalization and underlying mechanisms and processes;
• Awareness raising: informing and sensitizing the society to search for solutions in the fight against violent radicalization;
• Training and coaching of professionals active in controlling radicalism;
• Project management: initiating and coordinating innovative projects to prevent violent radicalization.

Mayors who want to tackle or prevent the problem of radicalization in their communities can call upon the Unit Radicalism. One of the first actions of the Unit was specifically focused on Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria by organizing a coordination meeting with several cities and towns which have included the prevention of radicalization in their strategic plans and/or enjoy a financial support for a pilot project on radicalization (Antwerp, Anderlecht, Brussels, Vilvoorde, ...). The aim of this meeting is in the first place to inform the professional staff on the latest trends in the field of tackling radicalism and terrorism and to provide tools and good practices that can be useful for an approach on local level. The group will meet every quarter.

Concerning the SCREENING OF ASYLUM SEEKERS a new procedure was put in place. The Immigration Office identifies applicants who lodge an asylum application. The applicants have to identify themselves by giving their names and present, if possible, their identification documents (passport, identity card, military booklet, and so on). All identity documents are checked by the specialized service of
the Federal Police to determine the authenticity of the documents. The Immigration Office and the Police will systematically undertake a search in the Schengen Information System (SIS) to check whether the person is not the object of an alert for refusal of entry. A photograph and the fingerprints of every applicant for international protection are taken during the preregistration of the asylum seeker. The fingerprints are compared by the Immigration Office in the national database of the Immigration Office (PRINTRAK) and in the European database for asylum seekers (EURODAC). The fingerprints are also checked in the database of the Federal Police. If the fingerprints demonstrate that the person concerned is known under another name (alias), the Immigration Office will check whether a procedure is already ongoing for this person and will try to determine his/her exact identity.

Since September 2015 the State Security (Veiligheid van de Staat) performs the screening of all asylum seekers and Iraqi and Syrian asylum seekers are also screened by the Military Intelligence and Security service. The Immigration Office establishes a list of names (and any aliases) of all asylum seekers and hands it over to the Intelligence and Security Services who performs a check on the basis of specialized databases, including the international list of known Foreign Terrorist Fighters, based on the hit/no hit principle. In the event of a confirmed hit the State Security transmits the useful information to the Immigration Office and the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, with a copy to General Intelligence and Security Service (ADIV) and the Federal Police.

It should be noted that the State Security is a defensive intelligence service and that most of the asylum seekers are unknown to the State Security since most of them are newcomers. This screening does not provide a definitive answer. The Immigration Office and the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons may at any time during the asylum procedure contact the State Security to inform this service of a problematic profile. The State Security can then conduct a more thorough investigation. In addition to those proceedings and in the context of their competences the State Security and the Federal Police remain vigilant for all signals in connection with the migrant crisis.

3. Note that it is not up to the migration and asylum authorities to determine that a person is radicalized. If staff of the reception facilities detect compelling signs or elements, they are obliged to report to the relevant authorities according to a communication of information protocol. An excel sheet (Reporting Sheet – Radicalism) has to be filled out and send to Fedasil headquarters and to the contact point of the local police by the manager of the reception center (this procedure is applicable since 15.03.2016). The goal is to determine whether those elements can be confirmed or not and whether the asylum seeker concerned may or may not be considered to be a threat to public order and / or national security. The staff of the reception
facilities received a training focusing on the detection of radicalization signals (see below). If a staff member detects signs of radicalization, the police and the management of Fedasil are immediately contacted to monitor and take measures adapted to the individual situation. Moreover, in the Working Group Asylum and Migration on Radicalism, it is examined how the exchange of information could be further strengthened and/or improved and what to do in terms of the right to residence of the individual. Concerning residence, each situation is considered on a case by case basis depending on the elements available to the instances of migration and asylum. Depending on the progress of the proceedings and the applicant’s individual situation, it is evaluated whether or not administrative measures can be taken.

In 2015 the State Security already trained the staff of the Immigration Office and the Office of the Commissioner general for Refugees and Stateless Persons (the institution competent for processing the asylum applications in Belgium) on radicalism. The aim was to make them aware of the problem and to recognize radicalization. In several months an information session is planned for this staff to clarify the role of the new support Cell Radicalism of the Immigration Office and to clarify the signs and elements that demand reporting. At this stage the staff (6 staff members) of the Cell Radicalism is still being trained themselves (with the State Security, the Threat Assessment Coordination Body (OCAD), the Military Intelligence (ADIV), the Directorate General of Prevention and Safety and the Police) since the cell was set up only very recently (1 May 2016).

In the beginning of 2016, Fedasil has set up a training for the staff of the reception centres regarding the phenomenon of radicalism in collaboration with the State Security. During this training, staff members and the supporting services learned how to identify signs of radicalism, how to prevent radicalism and how to react adequately to (signs of) radicalism in reception centres.

The training consists of two parts:
1. E-learning: Online tool on the phenomenon of radicalisation
2. Face-to-face with members of the State Intelligence Service and experts on radicalism: the topics that are discussed are
   • Geo-political context of Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria and the influence on migration flows in Europe;
   • Role and functioning of State Intelligence Services and its collaboration with Fedasil;
   • Islamic radicalisation;
   • Recognizing and reporting signs of radicalism in reception centres (from radicalization to recruitment).

As mentioned above, Fedasil is part on the working group Asylum and Migration on Radicalism. In case of suspicion of radicalism of one of the residents in a reception facility, Fedasil, transfers all the necessary
information to the Immigration Office who will sent this information to the competent services: the Threat Assessment Coordination Body (OCAD), the General Service Intelligence and Security (ADIV), State Security, the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees and Stateless persons and the Federal Police.

4. Yes,
   During the above mentioned training, the role and functioning of the State Security was discussed by members of this service, a system for centralised reporting and monitoring of (signs of) radicalism at the competent services was set up and reception centres concluded agreements with local police forces in order to set up a line of communication, including communication regarding radicalism. The departments asylum and detention centres of the Immigration Office have been asked to report cases which they consider problematic and possibly related to radicalism. The Immigration Office is working on a more systematic approach of the phenomenon (in development).

5. Since the asylum and migration authorities were asked to report signs of radicalisation, even in the event of doubt, there number of alerts have clearly increased. But this does not per se means that there are actual more cases of radicalisation or jihadism in or around the asylum process. Except for the reporting obligation there are different other reasons: the arrival of asylum seekers has increased, information on terror attacks is circulating daily, links made between migrants / asylum seekers and terrorists, the recent creation of the Radicalism Cell (Immigration Office) has received attention both internally and externally and officers of the asylum services and closed centers who did not yet receive a training tend to report more than their trained colleagues.

Croatia

1. Since this issues fall under the matter of the national security and police it is not known to the public.
2. Since this issues fall under the matter of the national security and police it is not known to the public.
3. Since this issues fall under the matter of the national security and police it is not known to the public.
4. It is beyond our knowledge.
5. No information available.
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| Cyprus           | Yes    | 1. This is matter of national security, being dealt with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the relevant department of the Cyprus Police and therefore we are not authorized to disclose any relating information.  
2. Please see above  
3. Please see above  
4. Please see above  
5. Please see above |
| Czech Republic   | No     |         |
| Finland          | Yes    | 1. According to the Finnish Security Intelligence Service's reviewed threat assessment of November 2015, the terrorist threat against Finland has increased and become more complex. Even though the threat of structured attacks by terrorist organizations is low, the risk posed by individual terrorist actions has continued rising after the previous assessment given by the Finnish Security Intelligence Service in June 2014. Finnish citizens may also become targets of anti-Western attacks abroad. In 2015 and 2016 The Finnish Security Intelligence Service handed over several terrorism-related cases for pre-trial investigation, which is the responsibility of the National Bureau of Investigation. The newest legislation related to terrorist offence provisions of the Penal Code entered into force on 1 January 2015. The scope of the criminalization of financing of terrorism was expanded and receiving training for the commission of a terrorist offence was criminalized. The punishment for receiving training for terrorism ranges from fines to imprisonment for at most three years. In line with the UN Security Council's resolution 2178, a Government bill to amend the provisions in Chapter 34a of the Criminal Code was submitted to Parliament in 2 June 2016. It is proposed that a new section 5b be added to the Criminal Code, criminalising travels to another country with a view to committing a terrorist offence, and that section 5(2) of Chapter 34a be amended to criminalise the financing of such travels as terrorist financing. An attempt to commit such offences would be punishable. It is at the same time proposed that Chapter 10 of the Coercive Measures Act and Chapter 5 of the Police Act be amended for instance to expand the availability of covered coercive measures. Since 27 January 2015 Finnish police has been provided with access to passenger information in order to prevent and detect crime. |
In practice, this means that the police in Finland will now have the same access to passenger data that is already provided to customs officials and the Border Guard. The two latter authorities can now request register information from travel agencies, tour operators and airlines for the purposes of crime prevention and investigation. The new police access will be utilized in countering terrorism and is one of several measures contained in the updated national counter-terrorism strategy approved last year. Those parties who refuse to surrender passenger data to the police will be subject to penalties. Finland has set up a project to develop a national PNR system. The project involves the Finnish law enforcement authorities. It is managed by the National Police Board and involves the Finnish Border Guard and the Customs. As a member of the European Union, Finland will implement the EU PNR Directive by June 2018. The PNR system will serve all the law enforcement authorities at the national level and other Member States in the framework of PNR cooperation and international crime prevention. The PNR system is expected to be used in the prevention of international terrorism and serious crime with automatic means. The tool will assist in directing the law enforcement resources in an appropriate and targeted way in activities such as anticipating and monitoring of the movements of already recognized people involved in terrorism and serious crime as well as when legal prerequisites are met, in prevention of movements. Intelligence gathering for the purpose of preventing, detecting and investigating the proposed new criminal offences. The terrorist threat against Finland is low at present. There are, however, indications that actors in Finland are involved in supporting and financing violent activities abroad or that Finland is being used as a transit country for people linked to terrorism. The aim of counter-terrorism is to identify and prevent threats against Finland before they occur. The Government has laid down guidelines on counter-terrorism and called for its further development. In addition, the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the related Action Plan set out ways of strengthening international cooperation and list the measures to be taken to combat terrorism. In counter-terrorism work, both intelligence work and cooperation at national and international levels play a significant role. In Finland, the police monitor and analyse international terrorism and related phenomena. Identification and prevention of violent radicalisation and illegal extremist activities call for broad-based cooperation both among authorities and between authorities and civil society. By preventing social exclusion, fostering greater dialogue and understanding between cultures and religions and promoting human rights, equality and democracy, we are able to address the factors underpinning violent radicalisation and recruitment into terrorist groups. Investigation of terrorist offences and legislation Finnish legislation provides for the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and the imposition of penalties. The Criminal Code, the Police Act, the Pre-trial Investigation Act and the Coercive Measures Act all govern
the detection and investigation of terrorist offences. In Finland, the responsibility for the pre-trial investigation of terrorist offences rests with the National Bureau of Investigation. If necessary, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service assists the Bureau in the investigation. On special grounds of state security, the Security Intelligence Service may also investigate a terrorism-related offence. There are also other authorities involved in the pre-trial investigation who assist the police unit conducting the investigation, for example, by providing expert assistance. Documents: - The Government’s Decision in Principle for a National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2014 - 2017 (available only in Finnish) - The National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 29.4.2016 (available only in Finnish)

2. The suspected terrorism connections are reported to the Finnish Security Intelligence Service. The asylum interviewers have country of origin information concerning ISIS areas produced by the COI Section of the Finnish Immigration Service. If an asylum seeker originates from an ISIS area or there are other indications of jihadism, the interviewer will ask more specific questions. If it is suspected that the asylum seeker has been involved in jihadism, there will be a complementary interview held by a case worker specialised in excluding clause cases who have taken the EASO exclusion module training. In The National Bureau of Investigation there is since 1st of April 2016 a team specialized in the asylum seeker matters, the so called TUPA-team. It consists of members from the Police, Finnish Security Intelligence Service, the Customs, the Border Guard and The Finnish Immigration Service. The team gathers information in cooperation within officials and, if needed, makes further investigations. The main aim is to prevent criminal activity, maintain security and identify persons involved in e.g. terrorist activities. The police have access to the immigration matters™ information system through which it can inform the asylum interviewer about the suspects of jihadism. Through its operational activities and international information exchange, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service gathers information regarding potential persons of interest, who may be trying to settle into Finland through the asylum process. The Finnish Security Intelligence Service analyses the information it receives and forwards it to national and international partners. In addition, the Finnish Security Intelligence Service reports on developments regarding the terrorism situation when needed.

3. According to The National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Extremism one highlighted action is to train the staff in the reception centers and others who work with the asylum seekers to recognize violent radicalization and to prevent it. It has been noticed that attempts to recruit for jihad have happened at the reception centres™ private areas and according to the reception centres™ residents it has happened outside the reception centres at the public areas as well. The reception centres have
been sent a letter concerning how to react in these situations and the police shall be called with low threshold. However the recruiter has often disappeared before the police have arrived. Reception centres have been trained concerning the extremism in the common training days and the police have offered special training for individual reception centres. If reception centre staff is suspecting the radicalization or sympathies for the jihadist values, they are instructed to contact the police, which will decide whether further investigation is needed.

4. A concrete measure based on The Governments Decision in Principle for a National Counter Terrorism Strategy to increase the consciousness of terrorism matters, was the establishment of the counter terrorism cooperation group led by the Police Board and involved members from the Police, different ministries and other organisations. The cooperation group deals regularly with the terrorism situation in Finland and each administrative sector takes matters in consideration in their emergency plans and daily actions for the suitable parts. According to The National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Radicalisation and Extremism the following actors are involved in preventing the radicalization: politicians and decision makers, social affairs, health care, youth work, education, police, the security intelligence service, NGOs, religious communities, reception centre staff and others who are working with the asylum seekers. The actors have been trained to recognise and prevent radicalisation.

5. The amount of people travelling to conflict areas in order to join terrorist groups has increased. These people and those who have returned to Finland have increased the challenge of radicalisation and recruitment for jihad. As a result of the increase in the number of asylum seekers, there has also been an increase in the number of persons of interest from the perspective of counterterrorism. Persons with possible linkages to radical organisations have entered Finland among asylum seekers. Asylum seekers with false identities or whose identity cannot be verified pose a challenge. It is also challenging to verify the claims of the asylum seekers, as well as the intelligence received regarding the asylum seeker in question. The waiting times in the asylum process, inactivity and racism asylum seekers face may lead to radicalisation on an individual level. Also persons belonging to Islamic extremist networks, who live in Finland, may attempt to radicalise asylum seekers. On the other hand, many asylum seekers have fled to Finland because of radical organisations, which may result in deterring possible radicalization on their part.
1. In December 2014, the French National Assembly set up a Committee of inquiry on control over networks of Jihadists and individual ones. But, the risks identified by the committee did not specifically target the asylum procedure. The main pathways identified were: social networks, mosques and prisons. During the debate in Parliament on the law on asylum of 29 July 2015 and in a context of increasing terrorist threat, it has been decided to transpose an optional provision of the Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 which provides the possibility -for the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) or the administrative authority- to refuse refugee status or to remove it when: 1/ there are serious reasons to consider that the presence in France of the person constitutes a serious threat for State Security or, 2/ the person has been convicted by a final judgement in France either for a crime, or for a misdemeanor constituting an act of terrorism or punished by a period of imprisonment of ten years and his/her presence represents a serious threat to Society. Now, this provision appears under article L. 711-6 of the Code on Entry and Residence of Foreigners and Right of Asylum (CESEDA). It completes provisions under article L. 712-2 of the CESEDA which provides that subsidiary protection can be denied or removed to an alien when his/her activity on the territory constitutes a serious threat for public order, public safety or State Security.

2. The Government has set up a new alert system for phenomenon of radicalization available online on the website: http://www.stop-djihadisme.gouv.fr/. A national hotline is also available to report and alert, protect and accompany young individuals and their families. In order to report a violent radicalization, one can also fill out a form online. But, these measures do not target specifically individuals in the asylum procedure. Due to provisions described above (Q1), OFPRA is attentive/mindful of security concerns during the asylum interview. The OFPRA also consults anti-terrorist units and controls the asylum seeker’s criminal record before delivering him/her a refugee status or subsidiary protection. The administrative authority (Minister in charge of asylum issues or Prefect) may also draw the OFPRA attention on specific profiles which deserves a special attention or which can justify a negative decision. If a threat to public order appears after the recognition of international protection, following alerts from intelligence agencies or other information gathered locally, the administrative authority is authorized to require the removal of the protection to the OFPRA.

3. No action is undertaken by reception centers for asylum seekers (CADA) since it does not appear among the missions of social or medico-social establishments. But, if reception centers managers identified phenomenon of radicalization in their structures, they would, for sure, report it to the competent Police.
services. Additional information: Irrespective of security controls organized in the framework of asylum request instruction in the territory, French authorities are attentive to these problematics for “external operations”. Regarding relocation programs from Greece and Italy and resettlement programs from Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, there is a double-checking system: a security screening based on the nominal list provided prior to the mission, and a security control during the interviews on-the-spot with candidates to relocation or resettlement.

4. No. But the Government has set up an action plan against radicalization and terrorism which prevails: Measure 34: the creation of a national coordination unit of actions of department Prefects, collectivities and associative networks within the General Secretary of the interdepartmental committee on prevention of delinquency and radicalization (CIPDR). Measure 53: the reinforcement of training for actors in contact with public who may be targeted by radical movements or involving radicalized persons.

5. No precise information available.

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<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1.</strong> The risk of illegally migrated jihadists formally seeking asylum has been acknowledged and addressed by the German government, as the attached document (Drucksache 18/8215) depicts.</td>
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<td><strong>2.</strong> Also the risk of recruitment activities of refugees and asylum seekers in Germany has publicly been addressed by the national intelligence service (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: <a href="https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/aktuelles/schlaglicht/schlaglicht-2015-10-fluechtlingsstrom">https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/aktuelles/schlaglicht/schlaglicht-2015-10-fluechtlingsstrom</a>).</td>
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<td><strong>3.</strong> The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) registers refugees seeking asylum in Germany. In the context of an automated comparison of data the respective authorities scrutinize detected matches. Thereafter the results of this screening are integrated in the procedure for granting the right of asylum. In case of security relevant information that is generated during the process of assessing the refugee’s legal reasons for admitting asylum, the BAMF informs the relevant security authorities. In this context the Federal Police maintains a close exchange of information with the respective security authorities on state and federal level. In case of further reasons for suspicion of an asylum seeker being a member of a terrorist organization, these leads are examined accordingly. If necessary the corresponding working groups within the Common Counterterrorist Centre (Gemeinsames Terrorabwehrzentrum GTAZ) discuss the cases.</td>
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4. In order to train the personnel working in the reception centres and shelters the respective federal intelligence services have created brochures informing about jihadist salafist movements in Germany. Furthermore the employees of the BAMF that work closely with the refugees are trained and informed about indicators for security relevant constellation by the security section of the BAMF. 

5. As the number of asylum seekers increased in Germany, so did the number of reports of security relevant constellations.

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<td>Hungary</td>
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| Latvia   | Yes    | 1. Yes, however the information is classified and cannot be revealed in public.  
2. Yes, the verification of information about the asylum seekers is conducted. There are also interviews with asylum seekers being done.  
3. Yes, the events in the reception centres are monitored as well as the visitors are registered and monitored during their visits at the reception centres.  
4. In addition to the procedure established by the Regulation of the Ministry of the Interior on cooperation among institutions involved in the asylum procedure where all necessary actions and responsibilities regarding possible threats are indicated, in January 2016 responsible institutions had joint seminar-training on security issues and conditions that could trigger deeper investigation regarding potential security risks (jihadists among asylum seekers, radicalisation etc.)  
5. No |
| Lithuania| Yes    | 1. During the debates in the Parliament such risks have been mentioned. Ministry of the Interior with other relevant institutions is responsible for ensuring that foreigners posing threat to security could not be admitted under asylum procedures.  
2. Officials at the Foreigners's reception center have been informed on possible risk indications. Information |
1. Following the Paris attacks, the Luxembourgish Prime Minister announced on 26 November 2015 certain amendments to the security measures in a joint meeting with the Legal affairs and Public Force commissions of Parliament. The Ministry of Justice and the Secretary of State of the Interior Minister presented these amendments to the press (See gouvernement.lu, Le Premier ministre Xavier Bettel a annoncé une adaptation des mesures de sécurité, 27.11.2015). However, the amendments do not address the radicalisation of international protection applicants in the reception centres. In the past, there have been several parliamentary questions on the issue. The latest was a parliamentary question raised by Fernand Kartheiser, MP (Parliamentary Question n° 1676 of 11 January 2016) on the fact that the person who attacked a police station in Paris spent several days in a reception centre in Luxembourg. The latter requested an appointment to file an international protection application, but left the reception facility before the appointment took place. Luxembourg emphasises in particular the importance of international cooperation among the security authorities.

2. Yes. The asylum unit is in close contact with the Luxembourgish Intelligence Service as well as the Anti-Terror unit of the Luxembourgish Police, where a regular exchange of information is maintained. Article 6 (3) paragraph 2 of the law of 18 December 2015 on international protection and temporary protection establishes that following the applicant’s presentation of the international protection, the Judicial Police proceeds to make all the necessary controls and verifications in order to establish the identity and the travel itinerary of the applicant. In order to do so, the Judicial Police collects the fingerprints and takes a photo of the applicant. Thereupon, they run the fingerprints through the EURODAC database and other police databases in order to establish the identity of the individual. Every original ID document is verified for authentication by a specialised unit of the Luxembourgish Police. A shuttle bus service brings the newcomers every day from the reception centres to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus ensuring that

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| Luxembourg | Yes | 1. Following the Paris attacks, the Luxembourgish Prime Minister announced on 26 November 2015 certain amendments to the security measures in a joint meeting with the Legal affairs and Public Force commissions of Parliament. The Ministry of Justice and the Secretary of State of the Interior Minister presented these amendments to the press (See gouvernement.lu, Le Premier ministre Xavier Bettel a annoncé une adaptation des mesures de sécurité, 27.11.2015). However, the amendments do not address the radicalisation of international protection applicants in the reception centres. In the past, there have been several parliamentary questions on the issue. The latest was a parliamentary question raised by Fernand Kartheiser, MP (Parliamentary Question n° 1676 of 11 January 2016) on the fact that the person who attacked a police station in Paris spent several days in a reception centre in Luxembourg. The latter requested an appointment to file an international protection application, but left the reception facility before the appointment took place. Luxembourg emphasises in particular the importance of international cooperation among the security authorities.

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international protection applicants will not reside for several days or weeks in the reception centres without being identified.

3. Yes. The concerned authorities (Police, Luxembourg Reception and Integration Agency (OLAI), Directorate of Immigration) meet monthly to take stock of the situation. In case of need, the parties concerned communicate directly with each other. The security guards and the staff in the reception centres will report any suspicious or abnormal behaviour by any of the international protection applicants, in accordance with article 23 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Answer to the parliamentary question no. 1676). There is a closed collaboration between the authorities and the police on these issues.

4. Yes. The employees of the asylum unit, especially those who are in direct contact with the applicants (employees in charge of registration and interviews), have participated in a basic training by the Luxembourgish Intelligence Service. This training mainly focussed on creating awareness for the detection and the identification of extremists.

5. No.

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| Netherlands   | Yes    | 1. The Dutch parliament is periodically informed by the Minister of Security and Justice regarding the terrorism and national security policies and comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism. One of the issues discussed in parliament is the reporting structure of possible signals regarding foreign nationals and asylum seekers who (possibly) poses a threat to national security related to involvement in terrorism, jihadism and radicalization. Parliamentary debates discuss the state of affairs regarding (counter)terrorism, jihadism and specific debates took place after the attacks in Paris and Brussels, which included discussions about the above mentioned risks. The reports discussed can be obtained from the website: https://english.nctv.nl/publications-products/.

2. The Dutch organizations cooperating in the immigration process have taken such measures in alliance with the identification & registration procedures and the operating framework on jihadism, including amongst others checks of id- and travel documents by the Dutch Police and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee. The process detailed below, refers solely to the reporting structure for the organizations most directly involved in the immigration process: The organizations most directly involved in the immigration process: the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND), the Central Agency for the Reception of
Asylum Seekers (COA) and the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V) have a reporting structure for signals that a foreign national (possibly) poses a threat to national security like involvement in terrorism, jihadism and radicalization. These signals are reported to the AIVD; the Dutch General Security and Intelligence Service. Some signals are also reported to the Dutch Military Security and Intelligence Service: the MIVD. The IND, COA and DT&V receive signals from partner organizations such as police, municipalities, but also from citizens. Furthermore, the employees from the IND, COA and DT&V pick up signals or indications that a foreign national possibly poses a threat to the national security during their everyday work. All these signals are reported to the Dutch Security and Intelligence Services; # Within the asylum process a specific screening has been built in. Screening by the IND is a specific process of investigation at the end of the identification and registration phase of the asylum process. It is being done on the basis of information from the Identification and Registration Process of the Dutch Aliens Police and Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and IND, such as: - the registration form; - first interview with the asylum seeker; - any third-party information; - and information derived from social media. This information is considered in conjunction with specific attention to signals that may indicate fraud (e.g. identity, nationality or visa), on human smuggling and trafficking, on war crimes, or on signals that could affect national security. A special screening instruction has been developed for the screening officials. Based on this screening follow-up action can be formulated. In the case of national security it would mean informing the Dutch Security and Intelligence Services. # Creating awareness (see answer on question 4);

3. Since March 2015 the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers is part of the reporting structure for signals that a foreign national (possibly) poses a threat to national security because of involvement in e.g. terrorism, jihadism and radicalization (as mentioned under question number 2). Regarding awareness see answer under question 4.

4. To ensure that relevant signals reach the Dutch Security and Intelligence services, from October 2014 until now the organizations cooperating in the immigration process reinforce the awareness amongst government officials (their employees) for these signals and inform them about the reporting structure. This is done amongst others through awareness trainings and information messages and by offering specific internal websites with information on national security. Furthermore, screening officials and officials specialized in fraud of the Immigration and Naturalization Service receive additional training on detecting signals that could be related to national security in order to increase expertise. Finally, the National Training Institute for Countering Radicalization that offers specialized courses on the phenomenon of radicalization,
jihadism and how to act upon signals of these phenomena, has developed a specific training for the organizations most directly involved in the immigration process. This training institute is stems from the Dutch Action Program against jihadism.

5. The extra investments on awareness among the officials of the organizations most directly involved in the immigration process in combination with the high increase of asylum seekers in the second half of 2014 and in 2015 and the broad media attention of the possibility of terrorists using the migration flows to travel to Europe, have caused a substantial increase in signals that a foreign national (possibly) poses a threat to national security and that have been reported to the Dutch Security and Intelligence Services.

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<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1. No.</td>
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<td>2. No. However, throughout the asylum process, there are many mechanisms that are used to outwit a series of situations that put into question the national security. When the applicant’s nationality isn’t considered safe, the process and its files are sent to the investigation department.</td>
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<td>3. See answer above.</td>
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<td>4. See answer to question 2.</td>
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<td>5. Nothing to report.</td>
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<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1. In December 2015, National Council of the Slovak Republic approved a Government proposal “a so called anti-terrorism legislation package” prepared in reaction of the Slovak Republic to the current security situation. Part of the package were changes in the Act on Police Corps, Act on the Travel Documents and Act on the Residence of Aliens. Potential risks have been regularly assessed by the state authorities. However, there were no changes made to the Act on Asylum.</td>
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|                          |          | 2. Asylum procedure has been conducted in a standard manner, no special measures have been adopted in order to raise awareness or create a reporting structure on possible jihadists within the asylum procedure. The risks mentioned were also assessed in the past while each asylum seeker has to go through a security
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1. Not to the best of our knowledge. If so it is a matter for the security police and not known to the public.</td>
<td>2. Not to the best of our knowledge. If so it is a matter for the security police and not known to the public.</td>
<td>3. Not to the best of our knowledge. If so it is a matter for the security police and not known to the public.</td>
<td>4. Not to the best of our knowledge.</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1. These risks have been discussed in internal meetings. The results have not been published.</td>
<td>2. Special Cases Unit have completed a series of awareness sessions to all Caseworkers within the Complex Case Working Directorate.</td>
<td>3. No additional measures have been taken.</td>
<td>4. All Complex caseworkers have received Counter Terrorism training and guidance on the referral process from Immigration National Security &amp; Counter Terrorism (INS&amp;CT), Immigration Intelligence and Immigration Enforcement.</td>
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5. This data is not available at this time.

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| Norway  | Yes      | 1. National security risks are acknowledged in the sense that Norway has established general guidelines stipulating that the Directorate of Immigration, that administers the reception centers, must notify the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) and the Ministry of Justice as soon as possible when anyone affiliated with the centers/reception process/application process suspects that an applicant can possibly represent a security threat.

2. - Every new case worker within the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) must undergo specialised training (half day) in identifying potential exclusion cases or security cases. - UDI has a specialised unit that process such findings and responds to inquiries from other case workers. They provide the training mentioned above. - This unit forwards such findings to the police and Ministry of Justice. However, these routines have existed for many years. - UDI has developed confidential profiles on countries from which asylum seekers who can pose security threats originate. They outline possible security issues related to the caseload, and the procedures for handling these cases. - The police have an increased focus on reporting possible jihadist connections. There are written instructions with examples on how to identify and detect potential candidates. Employees are aware of the routines and new case workers are given a thorough training regarding internal procedures and reporting structures. - Persons of concern (suspected threats) are reported directly to The Norwegian Police Security Service as well as to the separate project in the national intelligence system which logs in information about persons in question. This applies not only to asylum seekers but also to people who have been granted asylum as well as other foreigners with or without a residence permit in Norway. - The Police closely monitor relevant updates from Frontex, Europol, Interpol and other cooperating agencies and organizations. Modus operandi related to jihadist connections is distributed to employees via their leader.

3. Identification of radicalization and recruitment for the jihad is of high priority for Norwegian Police authorities, given that several residents of Norway have left the country to participate in battles for IS in both Syria and Iraq. In an effort to identify and prevent the recruitment representative from the police authorities visit various institutions, like asylum centers and mosques etc. where such persons may be located. We have a good dialogue with residents, management and staff at the asylum centers, and receive information about attempts at radicalization, influence from the outside, and unwanted incidents. The few
incidents which have occurred, were reported to The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST). The Norwegian International Police Immigration Service is present at the reception centers, and have responsibility for registering the asylum applications. However, in addition to the actual asylum reception centers, there are police monitored arrival centers where asylum seekers spend a short period of time getting their asylum application registered (response includes such work at centers in RÅde and TÅyen). The AHQ specifies that the information provided must be of such a nature as can be published openly. For that reason, details about routines will not be provided. The Norwegian police authorities have a thorough overview of the registration situation and well monitored facilities in both locations which do not allow for any intruders. The Norwegian National Police Immigration Service (PU) have together with other agencies working in the field of justice and public security developed a set of indicators which can be used to better identify asylum applicants who might represent a national security threat. In addition, other measures used in police work are systematically and consistently applied in relation to determining an applicant’s identity during the registration process. All operators of reception centers (and other asylum centers) are subject to regulations and routines on how to report and act when they discover any asylum seekers who have certain profiles (confidential information).

4. Employees of reception centers are trained about when to notify UDI or the police when they detect incidents that they interpret as being affiliated with national security risks or attempts at radicalization or any other behavior that would violate Norwegian law.

5. We cannot provide information about reporting radicalization or recruitment, but we can make the following comment: The absolute numbers of cases with suspicion of some affiliation with extremist groups has increased significantly since Oct. 2014. However, that must be viewed in the light of the overall (absolute) number of asylum seekers which has also increased significantly. So the percentage of such cases compared to the total number of applicants also in recent time, might well be the same, and if that is the case, it has remained unchanged the last three years. As mentioned previously, the police have an increased focus in regards to reporting on the presence of possible jihadists or incidents of radicalization. Since November 2014, the Oslo Police District has reported 68 potential candidates (for further investigation) to The Norwegian Police Security Service. In previous years the Oslo Police District reported around 2-4 cases on average per year. Otherwise, there is a good deal of discussion about this in the media, but no specific reports.