

**Etudes, opinions & politiques
migratoires belges: tendances
du rapport EMN 2025**



LIEGE université

CEDEM

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MIPEx)**



IMISCOE



LIÈGE université
CEDEM



fnrs
FREEDOM TO RESEARCH

2026 IMISCOE Spring Conference

Governing and Experiencing Migration in Contentious Times

16-18 March 2026


Campus Pitteurs of University of Liège (Rue de Pitteurs, 18, 4020 Liège) & online (Webex)

29 June - 2 July 2026 - Girona and
online

Strengthening
Migration Studies
through
Community
Engagement

23rd IMISCOE Annual Conference

IMI SCOPE MIGRATION RESEARCH HUB



* for migrants, sending and receiving countries

CEDEM BPACT ENQUETE (mai/juin '25)



14) Comment décririez-vous le quartier où vous habitez actuellement ?

Un quartier où XXX personne n'est d'une autre origine ethnique que la plupart des Belges

	Flandres	Wallonie	Bruxelles	Total
presque personne	380	309	51	740
	31%	47%	21%	35%
quelques personnes	591	265	93	949
	48%	40%	39%	45%
beaucoup de personnes	250	88	95	433
	20%	13%	40%	20%
Total	1,221	662	239	2,122
	100%	100%	100%	100%




Migration pour le travail

Taux Vacances d'emploi Q4 2025	BE	UE 27
Activités de services administratifs et de soutien	7.2	3.2
Activités spécialisées, scientifiques et techniques	5.4	2.4
Construction	5.0	2.9
Information et communication	4.2	2.2
Hébergement et restauration	4.1	2.4
Commerce; réparation d'auto/motocycles	3.8	1.8
Activités financières et d'assurance	2.9	1.7
Industrie manufacturière	2.7	1.5
Transports et entreposage	2.6	1.9
Electricité/gaz	2.5	1.2
Eau/déchets	2.3	1.3
Activités immobilières	2.0	1.9
Industries extractives	0.6	0.7

Job vacancy rates, 2022, 2023, 2024, and 2025 (%)

Lens, D., Mussche, N., & Chaloff, J. (2025). Improving the economic migration framework to attract & retain qualified talent in Flanders. OECD






A qualification et compétence égales, les employeurs devraient accorder la priorité en matière d'accès à l'emploi aux travailleurs non-immigrés par rapport aux travailleurs immigrés?



Regroupement familial

Figure 4.6. Estimated long term effects of delays in spouse arrival on their integration outcomes, 2013-17


Second-arriving married migrants who are aged 15-64, after 5+ years of stay, in percentage points



Fleischer, A., & Marín, R. (2019). Family ties: How family reunification can impact migrant integration. *International*

Figure 4.10. Differences in baseline academic proficiency of 15 year old migrants and native born, by age at arrival, 2015


Difference between migrant and native born students in attaining baseline academic proficiency, in percentage points



Note: Students who attain baseline academic proficiency are students who reach at least PISA proficiency level two in all three PISA core subjects – math, reading and science. The age of students can range from 15 years and three months to 16 years and two months.

Source: (OECD, 2018[38]) based on OECD PISA 2015 Database, <http://www.oecd.org/pisa/data/2015database>.

Résidents fiscaux belges en déciles 7-10 ($\approx >120\%$ revenu médian) par nombre de personnes à charge (2023)



Source: Statbel: Nombre de déclarations et revenu total net imposable par type de déclaration et par décile



Asile et voies complémentaires



Total number of first time permits

1,036,636

8

Countries of Origin

38

Countries of Destination



Filters

Country of Destination

All

Country of Origin

All

2019

2023

Permit Type

Family permits


Student permits

Labour permits


Named sponsorship

PAYS DE REINSTALLATION


of Permits by Country of Origin




of Permits by Type



of Permits by Region of Destination



of Permits by Country of Destination and Permit Type



OECD & UNHCR (2025). *Safe pathways for refugees V: OECD-UNHCR study on pathways used by refugees linked to family reunification, study programmes &*



Total number of first time permits

21,549

8

Countries of Origin



1

Countries of Destination

FILTERS

Country of Destination

All

Country of Origin

All

2019

2023



Permit Type

Family permits


Student permits

Labour permits


Named sponsorship

BELGIQUE


of Permits by Country of Origin




of Permits by Type




of Permits by Year and Permit Type



of Permits Issued by Year



OECD & UNHCR (2025). *Safe pathways for refugees V: OECD-UNHCR study on pathways used by refugees linked to family reunification, study programmes &*



Tihomir Sabchev & Marcus Engler (11 Dec 2025): Nudging forward: a novel strategy of shifting responsibility for beneficiaries of international protection. European Political Governance

CEDEM BPACT ENQUETE



En 2023, le gouvernement a pris la décision de suspendre l'accueil des hommes seuls demandeurs d'asile dans les centres d'hébergement.

L'une des mesures proposées pour réaliser des économies dans le budget est de diminuer le nombre de places d'accueil des demandeurs d'asile.

Le gouvernement doit faire plus d'efforts pour améliorer les conditions d'accueil des demandeurs d'asile.

Les autorités devraient envoyer les nouveaux demandeurs d'asile dans des centres d'accueil en dehors de l'UE pour que leur demande d'asile en Belgique y soit traitée.

Table 1: Summary of the impacts of the gaps/barriers and their estimated costs

Impact	Description	Estimated annual costs	
Impacts on irregular migration	Costs related to control of irregular migration and cost of human trafficking	€19.7 - 33.2 billion	
Impacts on external action and development cooperation	Costs associated with the attempt to limit departures from countries of origin and transit via external action tools	€1.7 billion	European Parliamentary Research Service, (2018). The Cost of Non-Europe in Asylum Policy. European Parliament
Impacts on employment and integration	Costs of limited labour market integration of refugees and tax loss due to shadow economy	€2.1-2.7 billion	
Impacts on living and health conditions of asylum-seekers	'Value of life losses', costs related to detention and poor reception facilities, healthcare costs	€11.8-17.7 billion	
Impacts on the efficiency of procedures	Costs of inefficiencies in Dublin transfers, at the application stage and in case of returns	€2.5-4.9 billion	
Total		€37.8-60.2 billion	




Migration irrégulière

Table 12: Size and share of the estimated irregular migration population by country, multiple years


Country	Irregular migration estimate		MIrreM quality assessment	Year	As a share of the total population (%)		As a share of the foreign-born population not covered by free movement policies (%)	
	Min	Max			Min	Max	Min	Max
Austria	62,000	62,000	M	2022	0.7	0.7	6	6
Belgium	112,000	112,000	M	2016	1.0	1.0	11	11
Finland	700	5,000	M	2020	<0.1	0.1	<1	2
France	200,000	300,000	H	2017	0.3	0.4	3	5
Germany	600,000	700,000	H	2017	0.7	0.8	8	10
Greece	100,000	200,000	M	2017	0.9	1.9	11	22
Ireland	15,000	20,000	M	2020	0.3	0.4	6	8
Italy	458,000	458,000	M	2023	0.8	0.8	9	9
Netherlands	23,000	58,000	H	2018	0.1	0.3	1	4
Poland	6,000	48,000	M	2019	<0.1	0.1	1	10
Spain	391,000	469,000	H	2019	0.8	1.0	8	10
UK	594,000	745,000	H	2017	0.9	1.1	10	13
12 European countries above	2,560,000	3,180,000	N/A	2016-2023	0.6	0.8	8	9
US	11,080,000	11,620,000	H	2022	3.3	3.5	24	25

Kierans, D., & Vargas-Silva, C. (2024). The irregular migrant population of Europe. *MIRREM Project: MIrreM*




Effects on return rates (forced & voluntary)

Return and readmission capacity



Coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals

Interstate Relations and Leverages




Stat. Significance

- Not Significant ($p > 0.05$)
- Significant ($p < 0.05$)

Gu, J., & Czaika, M. (2024). of Deliverable Working paper on non-policy drivers of enforced return. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 66.

Comparison: Number of persons required to leave (with and without *Duldung*) vs. number of state-supported and enforced returns from Germany, 2010–2020


thousands



Biehler, N., Koch, A., & Meier, A. (2021). *Risks and side-effects of German and European return policy: Foreign*


policy, security and development trade-offs (No. 12/2021). SWP Research Paper.

Figure 1 Typology of policy responses to the presence of irregular migrants: *A typology.*



Note: This typology examines national-level policy responses, not international (EU) or local and regional levels.

MIREX Dimensions Scores – Average for all 11 Countries



Le gouvernement devrait
régulariser le statut de séjour
des sans-papiers

...sur le territoire national?

... ayant des attaches sociales
durables? ...ou qui travaillent?

...dans un secteur en pénurie?



Intégration et démocratie




MIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY INDEX 2025

 **BELGIUM** ↑

2024

Rank: **Comprehensive (Top10)**


MIPEX Score (with Health): **70**





Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023

SETTLING IN



LIEN VERS LES INDICATEURS

3. Skills and labour market integration

Select indicator & countries

Progress in the host-country language


All

Select group of interest

Clear selection

Recent & Settled migrants

Total



3. Skills and labour market integration

Select indicator & countries

Participation in adult education and training


All

Select group of interest

Clear selection

Recent & Settled migrants

Total




OECD Political Participation Policy Index 2024




Belgium

Overall scores




Inscription électorale et déficit démocratique

● Voting-age population turnout rate ● Registered-voter turnout rate



Source: Pew Research Center, 2022

Population par Region, % (IBSA)



5. Civic engagement and social integration

Clear selection

Select indicator & countries


Acquisition of nationality

10+ ans de résidence: 79% Citoyens non-UE vs. 41% UE

Select group of interest

Foreign-born & Native-born

Total






Les autorités belges envisagent de porter les droits d'enregistrement que doivent payer les étrangers pour l'obtention de la nationalité belge de 150 EUR actuellement à 1.000 EUR. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous favorable ou

Faire face à une dépense imprévue non plus

Une dépense imprévue de 1.300 euros pose également un problème à 21,5% des Belges. De nouveau, cela touche près de 2,5 millions de Belges. Là encore, ce problème se pose principalement à Bruxelles (38,3%) et en Wallonie (32,6%), et moins en Flandre (12,3%). Environ la moitié des locataires (51,9%), des chômeurs (50,5%) et des membres de familles monoparentales (49,8%) ne disposent pas de cette réserve financière.

Incapacité à faire face à une dépense imprévue (pour des raisons financières)




Source: Statb

Faire face à une dépense imprévue non plus

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
Incapacité à faire face à une dépense imprévue (pour des raisons financières)



Source: Statk

1000 euros pour la naturalisation

Figure 4 – Naturalisation fees in EU countries (€)



Data source: [EMN](#), 2024 (with author's updates, 2025).

Dumbrava, C., (2025). Acquisition and loss of citizenship in EU Member States: Key trends and issues. European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament



Floris Peters, Swantje Falcke, and Maarten Vink

Abstract

In Europe there is substantial variation in the costs associated with applying for citizenship both between countries and over time. Yet how the costs of applying for citizenship affect naturalisation rates among immigrants remains remarkably understudied. In the Netherlands, application fees increased markedly in recent years from 336 euro in 2003 to 901 euro in 2020 for a single application, with significant hikes in the fee in 2010 and 2011. While simultaneous policy changes in civic integration requirements for long-term residence obfuscated the effects of higher fees and likely resulted in higher naturalisation rates among non-EU immigrants, we expect that for EU immigrants increased fees directly affected the cost-benefit calculation of applying for citizenship. Hence, in this chapter, we analyse naturalisation rates among EU immigrants in the context of increasing application fees by using longitudinal microdata from administrative registers on the complete immigrant population between 2007 and 2014. We use a two-step identification strategy. First, we apply a single-difference regression, based on a fixed-effects model, to investigate immigrant naturalisation rates in conjunction with increased application costs. We subsequently explore impact heterogeneity by household income and use a double-difference regression, based on a difference-in-differences model, to test whether the relevance of the fee increase is conditioned by income groups. Results show that increased fees are associated with an overall declining trend in naturalisation rates, especially for immigrants from low-income households. The impact of the fee increase for low-income migrants is comparable in magnitude to the relevance of having a low rather than high level of education for the propensity to naturalise. These results contribute to existing research on economic requirements for immigrant naturalisation and highlight the disproportionate consequences of high application fees.

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R. Barbulescu et al. (eds.), *Revising the Integration-Citizenship Nexus in Europe*. IMISCOE Research Series. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25726-1_3




Fig. 3.3 Linear fixed-effects regression on the heterogeneous effect of the increase in application fees for naturalisation in the Netherlands in 2010 on naturalisation rates (immigrants from the EU, incl. CH, IS and NO but excl. HR; 2007–2014). Dots denote point estimates and horizontal lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals. (Source: Table 3.1; Statistics Netherlands)

Estimated higher probability to be in employment associated with naturalisation, 2007

Percentage points

	Men	Women
Austria	-4***	6***
Belgium	14***	10***
Canada	4***	6***
Switzerland	6**	(4)
Germany	12***	11***
Denmark	12**	14***
Spain	(3)	(2)
France	5***	5***
Luxembourg	(3)	(7)
Netherlands	(1)	10**
Norway	(1)	(-9)
Sweden	20***	(-4)
United Kingdom	3*	6***
United States	(1)	8***

Liebig, T, (2011).
Naturalisation: A
Passport for the
Better Integration
of Immigrants?

Working Paper Research December 2022 N°427

Employment effect of citizenship acquisition:
Evidence from the Belgian labour market
by Souso Bignandi and Céline Piton



Abstract

This paper investigates whether citizenship acquisition affects immigrants' employment in Belgium. To do so, we rely on a longitudinal database, over the period 2008-2014, coupling administrative data from the Crossroads Bank for the Social Security (CBSS) and survey data from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS). During this period, citizenship was open to all immigrants who have been legally resident for at least 7 years, without any language or integration requirements. This allows us to study naturalisation in a liberalised context, avoiding part of the selection bias. The econometric analysis has been carried out using panel data fixed effects techniques applied to a programme evaluation model. We find that citizenship acquisition increases immigrants' employment by 7 percentage points after naturalisation. This effect persists even after controlling for endogeneity by exploiting an instrument for naturalisation and thus confirms the existence of citizenship premium in Belgium. Furthermore, the analysis by type of employment shows that citizenship has a positive effect on migrants' entrepreneurship as well as on their probability of finding a better and more stable job. Finally, using cross-section administrative data from the CBSS, covering the entire population, we find that citizenship effect is stronger for individuals with a non-EU origin.



Article

IJCS

Employment chances and changes of immigrants in Belgium: The impact of citizenship

Vincent Corluy
University of Antwerp, Belgium

Ive Marx
University of Antwerp, Belgium

Gerlinde Verbist
University of Antwerp, Belgium

Abstract

This article looks at the impact of citizenship acquisition on the labour market position of immigrants in Belgium. Citizenship is open to all immigrants with a sufficient period of legal residence, without any language or integration requirements. In that respect, this study is an important complement to existing studies which have mostly focused on countries with strict acquisition rules. Based on Labour Force Survey data for 2008, this study uses probit regression to estimate the static and dynamic employment probabilities and unemployment risks. We find that citizenship acquisition is associated with better labour market outcomes for non-Western immigrants in general. This effect remains after controlling for years of residence since migration, indicating the existence of a citizenship premium in Belgium.

Keywords

citizenship, employment probability, naturalization premium, selection effect

Introduction

Immigrants face many barriers in access to work and particularly to stable jobs that match their qualifications and aspirations. The native-immigrant employment gap remains very significant in many advanced economies and is the subject of both scholarly and public debate. One of the options available to policy-makers to improve employment chances is to grant citizenship rights to

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